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The Broken Safety Valve: Judicial Discretion's
Failure to Ameliorate Punishment Under
California's Three Strikes Law
Alex Ricciardulli"
Judges' power to reduce sentences imposed under California's
Three Strikes law under Romero has not diminished the severity
of punishment meted out under the law.' As the United States
Supreme Court reviews the constitutionality of the Three Strikes
statute, it should not allow the existence of power to impose lesser
sentences impact their assessment of law.
The ability of judges to dismiss "strike" priors and avoid 25-
years-to-life sentences has been hailed as "a safety valve for de-
fendants and society" which works to prevent unjust sentences
under the Three Strikes law.2 Supporters of the Three Strikes law
argue that Romero provides the statute "insulation" against con-
stitutional attack because the existence of "j]udicial discretion
softens the mandatory aspect of sentencing" under the law.'
Nonetheless, the defendants in the cases before the United
States Supreme Court were sentenced to life in prison despite the
trial judges' power to impose lesser sentences.4 The fact of the
matter is that the judicial power to reduce sentences under Ro-
mero has proven to be a paper tiger. This Article will show that
the "safety valve" in California is jammed shut.
* Los Angeles County Deputy Public Defender and Adjunct Professor at Loyola Uni-
versity and University of Southern California Schools of Law. J.D., 1987, University of
California Berkeley (Boalt Hall); B.A., 1984 University of California Los Angeles. The
author is the appellate attorney of record in over 16 published cases dealing with the Three
Strikes law, and wrote amicus briefs in the California Supreme Court in Romero, and the
United States Supreme Court in Andrade.
1. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal4th 497 (1996)
2. Remodeling "3 Strikes," S.F. EXAMINER, June 23, 1996, at B2-10.
3. Brian P. Janiskee and Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An
Analysis of the Case Against California's Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 64 (1995).
The Attorney General representing the government in one of the cases before the United
States Supreme Court characterized Romero as the "safety valve" that can save Three
Strikes. See David F. Pike, Supreme Court Will Consider Three-Strikes, L.A. DAILY J., Sep.
26, 2002, at 5.
4. The two cases are Lockyer v. Andrade, No. 01-1127, and Ewing v. California, No.
01-6978. Oral argument was conducted in both cases on November 5, 2002. Opinions are
due by June 30, 2003. See United States Supreme Court website available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/docket.html.
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The most controversial aspect of Three Strikes is the law's ap-
plicability to non-aggravated crimes. To qualify for a life sentence
under the statute, a defendant must have two prior convictions
which are "serious" or "violent" felonies.5 However, the third and
current offense which triggers the 25-years-to-life sentence can be
any felony whatsoever.6 This feature of the law has resulted in
notorious instances of defendants receiving life sentences for
crimes as banal as stealing pants and possession of minute quan-
tities of drugs.7 Defendants sentenced to 25-to-life must serve at
least 25 years before being eligible for release on parole.' These
are extremely stiff sentences for penny-ante crimes.
Romero held that judges can sentence defendants to lesser
terms if the judges find it would be "in furtherance of justice" to do
so. 9 At the time Romero was issued, approximately 53% of all the
defendants sentenced to life under the Three Strikes law were
there because of a non-"serious," non-"violent" current offense."
That amounted to about 970 petty thieves, coke possessors, and
other assorted ne'er-do-wells. Romero was made fully retroac-
tive.1 It was thus hoped that the hundreds of defendants impris-
oned for life under the law for lightweight crimes would have their
sentences reduced, and that few, if any, more defendants charged
with chintzy crimes would receive the Three Strikes law's ulti-
mate punishment. Alas, it was not to be. Romero utterly failed to
live to expectations.
As of June 2002, the number of defendants serving life in prison
for non-serious, non-violent crimes has more than tripled from the
time Romero was issued in 1996, with a whopping 3,052 defen-
5. "Serious" felonies are listed in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West 2002); "violent"
felonies are those in CAL. PENAL CODE 667.5(c) (West 2002). Although the two lists largely
overlap, the crimes denoted as "serious" felonies tend to be less serious than the "violent"
ones. For example, both burglary of a residence where nobody is home and unarmed rob-
bery are "serious" felonies, but they are not "violent" felonies. The complete list of "serious"
felonies is found infra at note 42; the list of "violent" felonies can be found infra at note 43.
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d), 1170.12(b) (West 2002).
7. See Keith C. Owens, California's "Three Strikes" Debacle: A Volatile Mixture of
Fear, Vengeance, and Demagoguery will Unravel the Criminal Justice System and Bring
California to its Knees, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 129, 153 (1995); Harriet Chiang, Uneven Justice
Under 3 Strikes-- Counties Vary in How They Enforce Law, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 23, 1996
(noting the case of a defendant who received 25 years-to-life for stealing two pairs of pants).
8. See In re Cervera, 24 Cal.4th 1073 (2001).
9. Romero, 13 Cal.4th at 504. The court relied on CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) which
allows a trial court to dismiss an action "in furtherance of justice." Id.
10. May 31, 1996, Cal. Dept. of Corrections Statistics, reproduced in Appendix B1.
11. Romero, 13 Cal.4th at 530, n. 13.
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dants serving life for these type of offenses. 2 Although the overall
percentage of defendants doing life for these crimes has dropped to
42.7% of the total number of three strikers, the sheer volume of
defendants condemned under the law speaks volumes regarding
the feebleness of judicial discretion in this arena."
Part One of this Article will trace the development of the Three
Strikes law. The controversy regarding the law's application to
minor current crimes will be discussed as the backdrop for the role
of judicial discretion.
Part Two will assess the importance of judicial discretion in
analyzing the constitutionality of the Three Strikes law, and show
how California cases subsequent to Romero have greatly narrowed
the scope of judges' discretion to reduce sentences. The cases have
deterred judges from imposing lesser sentences, and rendered ju-
dicial power virtually useless even to attempt to mitigate punish-
ment for non-serious and non-violent current crimes.
Part Three will illustrate the extremely limited nature of judi-
cial power by examining two Los Angeles County cases. In one,
the judge refused to exercise his discretion to reduce a sentence
even though the defendant's current offense was attempting to
break into a church to steal food. 4 In the other, the current of-
fense was unlawful driving of a vehicle and receiving stolen prop-
erty, and the California Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's
attempt to sentence the defendant to less than 25-years-to-life in
prison. 5 The reversal was ordered despite the fact that the defen-
dant's "strikes" occurred 17 years before the current offenses and
that the defendant was suffering from diabetes.
Part Four will analyze empirical evidence concerning the Three
Strikes law, and determine that the evidence corroborates the in-
efficacy of judicial power. A report promulgated by the State of
California Legislative Analyst's Office concluded that bench offi-
cers in California failed to appreciably change their sentencing
practices of people convicted of non-serious and non-violent cur-
rent offenses after the Romero decision. Likewise, statistics from
California's Department of Corrections regarding prisoners sen-
tenced to life sentences under the Three Strikes law in California
also establish affirmatively that the power to impose lesser sen-
12. June 30, 2002, Cal. Dept. of Corrections Statistics, reproduced in Appendix B5.
13. Id.
14. People v. Taylor, 71 Cal.App.4th 693 (1999) (rev. gr. at S079437 and S079437).
15. People v. Gaston, 74 Cal.App.4th 310 (1999).
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tences had very little impact on the sentencing of people convicted
of non-serious and non-violent offenses.
Finally, Part Five will argue that since judicial discretion has
not ameliorated sentences, there are only two meaningful ways to
alleviate the impact of the law: through remedial legislation,
and/or through a constitutional decision categorically barring a
life sentence for most non-serious, non-violent crimes. The re-
peated failure of efforts to change the law in both the Legislature
and through the initiative process have shown that legislative
change is unlikely.
The real chance for change thus currently rests with the United
States Supreme Court in Andrade and Ewing, and, failing that,
with the California Supreme Court. Given the California Su-
preme Court's past interpretation of the State Constitution as
broader than the Federal one, this Article concludes that an out-
come where the California Supreme Court reprises Romero with
an opinion surpassing its federal counterpart is not beyond the
realm of possibility.
I. THE LAW AND THE PROBLEM
A. In the beginning ....
The genesis of the Three Strikes law has been well-
documented.' 6 The law's origins go back to March 1, 1993 when
Mike Reynolds, a Fresno photographer, persuaded California As-
semblymen Bill Jones and Jim Costa to sponsor legislation aimed
at recidivist criminals: A.B. 971.17 Mr. Reynolds' daughter had
been brutally murdered by a person with a long criminal record,
and Reynolds was incensed that courts had been so lenient as to
let him out of prison, giving him the ability to carry out his daugh-
ter's killing. 8 Under A.B. 971, as under the current Three Strikes
16. An excellent summary of the political climate and legal maneuvering that led to the
Three Strikes law can be found in Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and the Romero Case:
The Supreme Court Restores Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1644-1674 (1997).
17. Id., at 1654, citing Phil Wyman & John G. Schmidt, Jr., Three Strikes You're Out
(It's About Time), 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 249, 253 (1995).
18. Twenty-five year-old Joseph Michael Davis put a gun to Kimber Reynolds' head and
tried to take her purse, shooting her in the process. See Gene Garaygordobil, Initiative
Would Up Sentences, VISALIA TIMES-DELTA, Aug. 18, 1993, at 1. Ironically, Joseph Davis
did not have any "strike" priors on his rap sheet: he had been previously convicted of gun
and drug charges, and had been released from prison on parole two months before the
killing after serving time for auto theft. Although he was wanted for a series of robberies
and assaults at the time of the shooting, he had not been convicted of any of these crimes.
Vol. 41
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law, defendants with two or more "serious" or "violent" felonies on
their record who committed any new felony would receive at least
25-years-to-life in prison.19 The bill went nowhere, being defeated
in the very first committee it was heard. °
Undeterred, Reynolds immediately started circulating a petition
to place his Three Strikes law on the ballot, and have the state's
voters decide whether to adopt it.2 This effort also went nowhere,
notwithstanding Reynolds' ingenuity and zeal. 2 Then, another
young girl was murdered: Polly Klaas. When the killer of 12-year-
old Polly was captured weeks after she was kidnapped from her
bedroom, Reynolds' campaign caught fire. It turned out Polly's
killer, like the murderer of Reynolds' daughter, was also a recidi-
vist, and public outcry over how such a person could be free on the
streets quickly reached a fever pitch.23
The Jones-Costa Three Strikes bill had reconsideration granted
in the Legislature, was set for a new vote in the Assembly Public
Safety Committee, and this time easily passed by a 7-1 vote. 4
Other legislators rapidly jumped on the bandwagon, introducing
several competing proposals to beef-up the existing habitual
criminal laws.25
Id. Joseph Davis was never brought to trial. Following a three-day man-hunt, he was
found in a friend's house, and was killed by the police during a shoot-out. As Mike Rey-
nolds put it, "[Davis] had 52 bullet holes in him, and he still lived for 15 minutes ....
Rarely is justice served out so quickly in this state." Tupper Hull, A Father's Crusade to
Lock Up Criminals, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 8, 1993, at A-1.
19. A.B. 971 (Jones, Costa), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1994). Sentences of greater
than 25-years-to-life are possible for single felony counts under A.B. 971 and the present
Three Strikes law. A complicated formula is provided for computing the minimum number
of years a defendant must serve before being eligible for parole under CAL. PENAL CODE §
667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
20. Dan Morain, A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at Al.
21. See Vitiello, supra note 16, at 1658-1660.
22. Mike Reynolds procured a toll-free number to help collect signatures for his initia-
tive: "1-800-CONVICT." See George Skelton, A Father's Crusade Born From Pain, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at A3. As explained by Reynolds, "We tried to get DIRTBAG, but that
turned out to be a vacuum cleaner." Id.
23. See Richard Price, Town Angry at System that Failed, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1993, at
Al. Polly Klaas' killer, like Kimber Reynolds' murderer was also surnamed Davis: Richard
Allen Davis. Unlike Kimber's killer, Richard Davis did have priors on his record which
would have qualified as "strikes": convictions for assault, burglary, and kidnapping. Id.
Also unlike Kimber's killer, Richard Davis was tried and convicted by a jury of his peers,
being sentenced to the death penalty for Polly's murder in August of 1996. Mary Curtius,
Jury Recommends Death Penalty for Polly Klaas' Killer, L.A. TIMES Aug. 6, 1996, at Al.
24. Assembly Committee on Public Safety, 01/06/94, A.B. 971 (1993-1994 Sess.).
25. Four other bills would have enacted a Three Strikes-type law in 1994. One of them
was A.B. 1568 (Rainey), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1994) (introduced 119/94). It would
have provided for lengthy sentences based on a defendant's recidivism: life in prison with-
out the possibility of parole when the defendant had prior convictions for at least two "seri-
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Already in existence was a statute providing life sentences for
criminals convicted of a third felony crime who had two prior con-
victions for violent crimes.26 Another law, much more commonly
applied, added five years for every "serious" felony prior that the
defendant had when he or she committed a new "serious" felony.27
Probably the most commonly applied habitual offender statute
was Penal Code section 667.5(b). 8 It added one year to a defen-
dant's sentence for every time the defendant had been to prison.
Section 667.5(b), unlike the other two laws, applied whenever the
defendant committed any new felony, even if the new offense was
neither violent nor serious.
Despite the availability of these laws, even before the Polly
Klaas case, there was a general perception that defendants were
not serving enough time behind bars. The widely-publicized
speedy releases of arm-chopping rapist Larry Singleton' and
ous" or "violent" felonies, as defined in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.5(c) and 1192.7(c), and the
defendant committed a new "violent" felony; life in prison without parole if the defendant
had two or more "violent" felony priors and the new offense was a "serious" or "violent"
felony; and 25-years-to-life if the had two "serious" or "violent" felonies and committed a
new "serious" felony. A second bill was A.B. 167 (Umberg), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal.
1994). This one would have imposed a sentence of life in prison without parole if a defen-
dant had at least two prior convictions for crimes on a list similar to the "violent" felony list
in § 667.5(c) who committed a new crime on the bill's list. A third bill was A.B. 2429 (John-
son), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1994), and it provided that a person who had two or more
prior "violent" felony convictions and committed a new "violent" felony would be punished
with life in prison without parole. Finally, the fourth proposal A.B. X19 (Johnson), 1993-
1994 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1994) was the narrowest of the bunch, merely increasing punish-
ment by 5 to 14 years when a defendant committed a designated sex crime with a prison
conviction for a sex crime.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.7 (West 2002).
27. This law is now located in CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a) (West 2002). Before the Three
Strikes law's enactment in CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)-(i), the five-year prior law was the
only recidivist law contained in § 667.
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (West 2002). § 667.5(a) presently contains, as it did in
1994, yet another recidivist provision which requires a defendant to receive a three-year
enhancement for every "violent" felony prior conviction when the defendant commits a new
"violent" felony. This law is never used, however, due to application of the five-year prior
law in § 667(a). Since all "violent" felonies are subsumed within the list of "serious" felo-
nies in § 1192.7(c), in situations where the three-year enhancement in § 667.5(a) would
apply, the five-year prior law also applies. The defendant gets sentenced under the five-
year prior law in these cases; he cannot be sentenced to both three years and five years for
the same prior. People v. Jones, 5 Cal4th 1142 (1993).
29. Larry Singleton kidnapped, raped, and cut-off both of the arms of his victim in
1978. He was convicted of the crimes and sentenced to the maximum available at the time:
14 years in prison. With credits for work and good behavior, he was released on parole
eight years and four months later. In January, 2002, Singleton died of cancer at the age of
74 in a Florida prison where he was awaiting his execution for murdering a Tampa woman
in 1997. See John Woolfolk, Notorious Rapist Larry Singleton Dies in Florida Prison, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 1, 2002, at 1.
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child-burner Charles Rothenberg" added fuel to the fire. The real
trouble lay in the generous early-release provisions in the Califor-
nia law. In 1993, defendants in California routinely spent only
50% of their sentence in prison by accruing credits for good behav-
ior and working in prison.31 The result was that even with sen-
tences as tough-sounding as twelve, or fourteen years in prison,
defendants got out in a mere six or seven years.3 2
Of the competing Three Strikes proposals, A.B. 971 was the
most radical. It followed the same format as the present Three
Strikes law, allowing any felony to serve as the trigger for a life
sentence. The law was an extremely harsh amalgamation of the
habitual criminal law in Penal Code section 667.7 and the one-
year prior law in 667.5(c), yet the proposal was approved, with
little dissent by the Legislature, instead of the competing bills in
March 1994."3 The competing bills were shelved, and only Rey-
nolds' A.B. 971 went to the governor for approval.' Governor Pete
Wilson had earlier expressed anger and incredulity that Polly
30. Charles Rothenberg burned his son beyond recognition in 1983 by dousing him with
kerosene and setting it afire; his son lived, being scarred over 90% of his body. Rothenberg
was convicted of several crimes for the burning, and sentenced to the maximum available
at the time: 13 years in prison. His parole in 1990 after serving approximately six and one-
half years in prison generated outrage. See Nancy Wride and Jim Herron Zamorra, Roth-
enberg Reported in Bay Area, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1990, at A3. In 1996, Rothenberg was
arrested in Oakland for allegedly shooting a man in the head; facing a Three Strikes life
sentence because of his previous crimes, Rothenberg took the case to trial, and was found
not guilty by a jury. Peter Fimrite, Man Who Burned Son Acquitted By Jury, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Oct. 31, 1996, at A15.
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2930 (1993 Stats.) The bar against dual-using the same prior
under different enhancement sections further helped reduce available sentences. See Peo-
ple v. Jones, supra, 5 Cal.4th 1142.
32. In 1993 and 1994 California did provide for "life" sentences for crimes such as mur-
der and some forms of kidnapping, allowing the California Board of Prison Terms to refuse
to release a person, potentially indefinitely. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190(a) (punishment
for first degree murder is 25-years-to-life), 209(a) (punishment for kidnapping for robbery is
7 years to life). (1994 Stats.) Proposition 89, approved by California's electorate in 1998,
subsequently added yet another roadblock to parole for lifers by giving the Governor a veto
over Board of Prison Terms decisions. See Alex Ricciardulli, Critics are Wrong on Davis'
Criminal Justice Record, L.A. DAILY J., Sep. 23, 2002, at 7. The constitutionality of the
Governor's veto was upheld by the California Supreme Court In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th
616 (2002).
33. The State Assembly approved the bill by a vote of 63-9; the Senate went along 29-7.
The Legislature realized that if they enacted a weaker bill, and Reynolds' initiative was
approved by the voters, the initiative would trump any contrary law. See Alex Ricciardulli,
The Three Strike Initiative: The Good News, (1995) 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 319, 324 ("when
two laws on the same subject are passed at different times and are inconsistent with each
other, the one last enacted must prevail"), citing Western Mobilehome Assn. v. County of
San Diego, 16 Cal.App.3d 941, 948 (1971), and Canteen Corp. v. State Bd. Of Equalization,
174 Cal.App.3d 952, 960 (1985).
34. See Morain, supra note 20, at Al.
8 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 41
Klaas' murderer had been freed from prison before her killing.35
It came as no surprise that he signed the bill into law on March 7,
1994.36
Yet another Three Strikes law was enacted when Mike Rey-
nolds' initiative was approved by the voters in November of 1994. 37
A competing initiative that might have given Reynolds' proposi-
tion a run for its money never materialized. The Legislature in
mid-1994 considered enacting one of A.B. 971's competing bills,
and putting it on the ballot for the voters' approval.38 Threatened
by a veto from Governor Wilson, the proposal never made it before
the electorate.39
The Three Strikes law specifies that a defendant convicted of
any current felony who has suffered two or more prior specified
convictions must be sentenced to at least 25-years-to-life in state
prison.40 To count as valid priors under the Three Strikes law, a
defendant's prior convictions must be either "serious" or "violent,"
as listed in Penal Code sections 667.5(c), and 1192.7(c), or, if they
originated from crimes committed as a juvenile under the age of
18, they must be listed in California Welfare and Institutions
Code section 707(b).41 "Serious"4 2 and "violent4 3 felonies, as well as
35. George Skelton, Wilson Seizes the Day After Polly's Murder, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1993, at A3 (Wilson told a reporter, "when I think of that son of a bitch, you cannot help but
be angered. Did you see the picture of him on the front page... ? Smirking? Jesus, boy. I
wanted to just belt him right across the mouth").
36. See Morain, supra note 20, at Al. The law took effect at 2:45 p.m. on March 7,
1994, the time that Wilson put pen to paper in an elaborate bill-signing ceremony. See
People v. Cargill, 38 Cal.App.4th 1551 (1995) (applying the new law to a defendant's pos-
session of cocaine case which occurred at 10:15 p.m. on March 7; the Court of Appeal, at p.
1553, remarked "This case illustrates the wisdom of the commonly-used phrase, 'Timing is
everything in life'").
37. Enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12. Some commentators tried to rely on differ-
ences between the initiative and Legislature's version of the laws to exempt some defen-
dants from the statutes. See Ricciardulli, supra, footnote 33, at 319-320. However, the
California Supreme Court eventually held that both laws are virtually identical. People v.
Hazelton, 14 Cal.4th 101 (1996). For simplicity's sake, all references in the remainder of
this Article will be to the Legislature's version of the Three Strikes law in CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667(b)-(i).
38. See Hallye Jordan, Backers Defend Alternative to "Three Strikes," L.A. DAILY J.,
June 10, 1994, at 3. The bill eyed for approval by the voters was A.B. 1568 (Rainey) which
would have provided a life sentence only if the defendant's current offense was a "serious"
or "violent" felony. Id.
39. A.B. 1568 was "gutted and amended" in August 1994 to delete all provisions creat-
ing a recidivist law. As signed by the Governor in September of 1994, the bill made it a
misdemeanor for guards at correctional institutions to have sexual relations with inmates.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 289.6(a) (West 2002).
40. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(2).
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d).
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42. "Serious" felonies are the following offenses: "(1) Murder or voluntary manslaugh-
ter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, threat of great
bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another
person; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury,
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (6) lewd or
lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years; (7) any felony punishable by death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life; (8) any other felony in which the defendant per-
sonally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in
which the defendant personally uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder; (10) assault with
intent to commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a
peace officer; (12) assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; (13) assault with a deadly
weapon by an inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with
intent to injure; (16) exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing bodily injury,
great bodily injury, or mayhem; (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with
intent to murder; (18) any burglary of the first degree; (19) robbery or bank robbery; (20)
kidnapping; (21) holding of a hostage by a person confined in a state prison; (22) attempt to
commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life; (23) any
felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; (24) selling,
furnishing, administering, giving, or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor
any heroin, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), or any methamphetamine-related drug, as de-
scribed in paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 11055 of the Health and Safety Code,
or any of the precursors of methamphetamines, as described in subparagraph (A) of para-
graph (1) of subdivision (f) of Section 11055 or subdivision (a) of Section 11100 of the Health
and Safety Code; (25) any violation of subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is accom-
plished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (26) grand theft involving a firearm;
(27) carjacking; (28) any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of
Section 186.22; (29) assault with the intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral copu-
lation, in violation of Section 220; (30) throwing acid or flammable substances, in violation
of Section 244; (31) assault with a deadly weapon, firearm, machinegun, assault weapon, or
semiautomatic firearm or assault on a peace officer or firefighter, in violation of Section
245; (32) assault with a deadly weapon against a public transit employee, custodial officer,
or school employee, in violation of Sections 245.2, 245.3, or 245.5; (33) discharge of a fire-
arm at an inhabited dwelling, vehicle, or aircraft, in violation of Section 246; (34) commis-
sion of rape or penetration by a foreign object in concert with another person, in violation of
Section 264.1; (35) continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5; (36)
shooting from a vehicle, in violation of subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 12034; (37) intimida-
tion of victims or witnesses, in violation of Section 136.1; (38) terrorist threats, in violation
Section 422; (39) any attempt to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than an
assault; (40) any violation of Section 12022.53; and (41) any conspiracy to commit an of-
fense described in this subdivision."
43. "Violent" felonies consist of the following crimes: "(1) Murder or voluntary man-
slaughter. (2) Mayhem. (3) Rape as defined in paragraph (2) or (6) of subdivision (a) of
Section 261 or paragraph (1) or (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 262. (4) Sodomy by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or
another person. (5) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person. (6) Lewd acts on a child under
the age of 14 years as defined in Section 288. (7) Any felony punishable by death or impris-
onment in the state prison for life. (8) Any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bod-
ily injury on any person other than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as
provided for in Section 12022.7 or 12022.9 on or after July 1, 1977, or as specified prior to
July 1, 1977, in Sections 213, 264, and 461, or any felony in which the defendant uses a
firearm which use has been charged and proved as provided in Section 12022.5, or
12022.55. (9) Any robbery. (10) Arson, in violation of subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 451.
(11) The offense defined in subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is accomplished
against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlaw-
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those in section 707(b)," are nearly uniformly aggravated offenses
41involving violence and sex crimes.
One remarkable aspect of the Three Strikes law is that the de-
fendant's current offense need not be "serious" to count as a
"strike": each and every felony can count as the current offense
which triggers a life sentence.
ful bodily injury on the victim or another person. (12) Attempted murder. (13) A violation
of Section 12308, 12309, or 12310. (14) Kidnapping. (15) Assault with the intent to commit
mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral copulation, in violation of Section 220. (16) Continuous
sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5. (17) Carjacking, as defined in subdivi-
sion (a) of Section 215. (18) A violation of Section 264.1. (19) Extortion, as defined in Sec-
tion 518, which would constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code. (20)
Threats to victims or witnesses, as defined in Section 136.1, which would constitute a fel-
ony violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code. (21) Any burglary of the first degree, as
defined in subdivision (a) of Section 460, wherein it is charged and proved that another
person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of
the burglary. (22) Any violation of Section 12022.53."
44. Juvenile adjudications under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) consist of: "(1)
Murder. (2) Arson, as provided in subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 451 of the Penal Code. (3)
Robbery. (4) Rape with force or violence or threat of great bodily harm. (5) Sodomy by
force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm. (6) Lewd or lascivious act
as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code. (7) Oral copulation by force,
violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm. (8) Any offense specified in subdi-
vision (a) of Section 289 of the Penal Code. (9) Kidnapping for ransom. (10) Kidnapping for
purpose of robbery. (11) Kidnapping with bodily harm. (12) Attempted murder. (13) As-
sault with a firearm or destructive device. (14) Assault by any means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury. (15) Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied build-
ing. (16) Any offense described in Section 1203.09 of the Penal Code. (17) Any offense
described in Section 12022.5 or 12022.53 of the Penal Code. (18) Any felony offense in
which the minor personally used a weapon listed in subdivision (a) of Section 12020 of the
Penal Code. (19) Any felony offense described in Section 136.1 or 137 of the Penal Code.
(20) Manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of any salt or solution
of a controlled substance specified in subdivision (e) of Section 11055 of the Health and
Safety Code. (21) Any violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the
Penal Code, which would also constitute a felony violation of subdivision (b) of Section
186.22 of the Penal Code. (22) Escape, by the use of force or violence, from any county juve-
nile hall, home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 871
where great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of the juvenile facility
during the commission of the escape. (23) Torture as described in Sections 206 and 206.1 of
the Penal Code. (24) Aggravated mayhem, as described in Section 205 of the Penal Code.
(25) Carjacking, as described in Section 215 of the Penal Code, while armed with a danger-
ous or deadly weapon. (26) Kidnapping, as punishable in subdivision (d) of Section 208 of
the Penal Code. (27) Kidnapping, as punishable in Section 209.5 of the Penal Code. (28)
The offense described in subdivision (c) of Section 12034 of the Penal Code. (29) The offense
described in Section 12308 of the Penal Code. (30) Voluntary manslaughter, as described in
subdivision (a) of Section 192 of the Penal Code."
45. Virtually all § 667.5, subd. (c) and § 707, subd. (b), priors are subsumed within the
list of "serious" felonies in CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1192.7, subd. (c); hence, for simplicity's
sake, references in this Article to "serious" crimes should be understood to also include ones
in § 667.5, subd. (c) and § 707, subd. (b).
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B. So where's the problem?
From the time of its enactment in 1994 to the present day,
many people expressed concern that a blanket 25-years-to-life sen-
tence for all third felonies, regardless of their seriousness was
overkill, and made little economic sense.46 Defendants' groups ar-
gued that life sentences for lightweight crimes were unjust, and
disproportionately impacted minority populations.47 Economists
and other experts warned that life sentences would overcrowd
prison and jails, undermining the state's economy and endanger-
ing public safety.48
Many others were quite content with the new law.49 Supporters
such as Bill Jones and ex-Attorney General Dan Lungren argued
46. Families to Amend California's Three-Strikes is an organization devoted to chang-
ing the law so that it does not apply to non-serious current offenses. "FACTS," as it is
known, maintains a full-time website detailing long sentences served by organization
members' kin, available at http://www.factsl.com. Citizens Against Violent Crime is a
similar organization with its own website, available at http://www.amend3strikes.com.
47. Lisa E. Cowart, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion: California's Three
Strikes Law Takes A Hit, 47 DEPAuL L. REV. 615, 652 (1998), states that "A California
Department of Corrections report has identified that forty-three percent of the criminals
convicted under three strikes laws are African-Americans" (citing William Claiborne, Study
Finds Disparity in "Three Strikes" Law: Blacks in California Disproportionately Sentenced,
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at A3). Cowart also notes that "African-Americans are sen-
tenced under three strikes laws at a rate of thirteen-to-one over Caucasians" (citing Carl
Ingram, Serious Crime Falls in State's Major Cities, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A3).
48. See e.g., Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 395, 433-434 (1997) Three Strikes critics point out that the cost of keep-
ing a person in prison for life is staggering, and this money could be better spent on crime
prevention, or to improve detection and prosecution by hiring more police, judges and dis-
trict attorneys. Id. Overcrowding of local jails due to Three Strikes defendants requesting
trials because they have nothing to lose have caused the early release of misdemeanor
defendants to free-up bed space. See Charles L. Lidner, Three-Strikes Law; Commit a
Misdemeanor-Don't Worry About Jail, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1995, at M1 (noting how some-
times, "misdemeanor defendants given the maximum one-year-in-County-Jail sentence will
serve, on average, 19 days behind bars"). In the first year of the Three Strikes' law's en-
actment, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office was forced to eliminate sections
of its office to allocate prosecutors to "strike" cases. Michael D. Harris, Garcetti Calls for
New 3-Strikes Law, L.A. DAILY J., June 9, 1994, at 2.
49. Governor Wilson, speaking in support of applying the Three Strikes law to a case
where the defendant stole 50 cents from a homeless person, stated "The editorial writers,
the pundits are claiming this thug is a victim of a misguided law .... The 'victim' has a rap
sheet that is 52 pages long .... The critics say that's proof of everything that is wrong with
the 'three strikes' law. Well, the hell with that. I say it's proof of everything that's right
with 'three strikes.'" George Skelton, Pete (Give 'em Hell) Wilson Strikes Back, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1994, at A3. Current Governor Gray Davis has taken a similar tack, going on
record favoring life sentences under the law for crimes such as stealing pizza. See "The
Bicycle Thief," 60 Minutes, CBS News Transcripts, May 26, 2002.
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that the law would drive crime down and send a message to poten-
tial crooks to straighten up or face the consequences.' °
The law quickly demonstrated that it would cast an immensely
wide net. Violent felons were ensnared, with robbers and rapists
being snatched off the streets. But, quite a few porpoises went in
with the tuna catch."' One defendant is serving 25-years-to-life in
prison for attempted possession of cocaine: an undercover police
officer convinced the defendant that a macadamia nut was a big
rock of coke.52
The debate could be seen as a battle of competing philosophies:
deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation versus rehabilitation.
One side argued that these "revolving door recidivists" were be-
yond hope, and that, since they had proved that they committed
bad crimes in the future, society could not await until they com-
mitted a new atrocity before taking them off the streets.53 Recog-
nizing that most of the habitual criminals trapped by Three
Strikes had long since burned out on committing violent crimes,
and had devolved to doing petty thefts and other minor offenses,
the proponents also argued that society could not afford to incur
the costs of nuisance crimes either.54 They were "doing life on the
installment plan" they reasoned, so why not get it over with in one
lump sum payment, and rid ourselves of these defendants for good
upon committing their third felony crime.55 Opponents argued
50. See Bill Jones, Why The Three Strikes Law is Working in California, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'y REv. 23 (1999) (generally extolling the virtues of the law); Dan Lungren, Three
Cheers for 3 Strikes, 80 POLY REV. 36 (1996) (arguing that the law is working because,
among other things, more parolees are leaving the state rather than subject themselves to
potential third-strike prosecutions).
51. The FACTS website lists an incredible litany of crimes which got defendants 25-
years-to-life, including, stealing a spare tire (People v. Landa, L.A. Cty. Sup. Ct. No.
VA048627); possession of .05 grams of heroin (People v. Orozco, San Diego Cty. Sup. Ct. No.
SCD 123362); petty theft of razor blades (People v. Quirino, Bakersfield Cty. Sup. Ct. No.
SC066095A); and filling.out a false driver's license application (People v. Anderson, Tulare
Cty. Sup. Ct. No. 36089). See http://www.factsl.com.
52. Scott Harris, Let's Hope the Future Bails Chief Out, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at B1;
Charles L. Lindner, Paying the Price for California's Prisons, 5 CAL. PUBLIC FINANCE, No.
20, May 22, 1995, at 6.
53. See Jones, supra note 49.
54. James A. Ardaiz, California's Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Conse-
quences, 32 MCGEORGE L.REV. 1 (2000). Ardaiz is the Presiding Justice of the Fifth Dis-
trict California Court of Appeal. He was one of the persons who helped draft the original
Three Strikes initiative for Mike Reynolds in 1993. See Dan Morain, Judge Admits His
Role in "3 Strikes"Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A3.
55. See Ardaiz, supra note 54, at 3-5. The calculus here is questionable. What costs
more, imprisoning a defendant for life, or having business insurance incrementally increase
and taxes infinitesimally inch up due to the costs of keeping these persons behind bars for
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that this smacks of preventive detention, and is better suited for
the former Soviet Union's Siberian gulag than in the world's pre-
eminent democratic nation.56 They claim that throwing away peo-
ple's lives, with no hope of redemption for decades, if ever, is nei-
ther cost efficient nor humane.
Disregarding the strengths of both arguments, whether the law
is working or not, the controversy over the statute is diverting
vast amount of resources, monetary and political, to keep it in its
present state.
II. THE RELEVANCE, RISE, AND DEMISE OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
A. The role of discretion in assessing the constitutionality of a
sentence
It is unclear precisely how judicial discretion factors into a con-
stitutional analysis of a sentencing law. Proponents of the Three
Strikes law have asserted that judges' power to dismiss priors and
impose lesser sentences provides the Three Strikes law "insula-
tion" against constitutional attack. 7  No in-depth analysis has
been provided. It has only been maintained that this "insulation"
is given because "U]udicial discretion softens the mandatory as-
pect of sentencing" under the law.5"
three or five year increments? See generally, FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, et al., CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA: THE IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT (1999).
56. See Vitiello, supra note 48, and Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three
Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87
GEO. L.J. 103 (1998).
57. See supra note 3.
58. Edward J. Erler, Californians and Their Constitution: Progressivism, Direct Democ-
racy and the Administrative State, 6 NEXUS J. OP. 237, 249-250 (2001) stated, "The Romero
decision, however, has probably helped insulate Three Strikes from attacks on federal due
process grounds. Judicial discretion will blunt arguments that allowing any felony to count
as a third strike violates the proportionality requirement for punishment under the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. This is surely one unintended
consequence of Romero." In support of this proposition, Professor Erler cited Janiskee and
Erler, supra note 3, "for an in-depth discussion of the due process issue." Erler, Califor-
nians and Their Constitution: Progressivism, Direct Democracy and the Administrative
State, supra, at 250. Yet, the only discussion of the issue in the cited article consists of the
statement that "One unintended-if perhaps maliciously ironic-consequence of Romero is to
provide some insulation against due process challenges. Judicial discretion softens the
mandatory aspect of sentencing that might otherwise provoke due process considerations..
• The Three Strikes law is a much more defensible law after Romero's construction."
Janiskee and Erler, supra, note 3, at 64-65. Janiskee and Erler, in turn, cited as support
Edward J. Erler, Transcript: The Fourth Driker Forum for Excellence in the Law, 45 WAYNE
L. REV. 1412-17 (1999). However, the referenced transcript merely contained Professor
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Yet, the United States Supreme Court has never actually stated
that courts' power to impose lesser sentences makes any difference
in constitutional cruel and unusual punishment analysis. In fact,
the Supreme Court appeared to reject this argument outright in
Solem v. Helm. 9
Solem held that a life sentence without the possibility of parole
was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual for a defendant con-
victed under a statute" that provided for such a sentence when
the defendant is convicted of any felony and had previously been
convicted of three of more felonies of any type.6 The defendant in
the case had received a life without possibility of parole for a cur-
rent felony of uttering a "no account" check for $100, and having
six non-violent felonies on his record.
Solem concluded that the penalty in its case was harsher than
that upheld in Rummel v. Estelle.' In the Rummel case, the pen-
alty in Texas for a defendant who committed any new felony with
at least two felony priors was life with the possibility of parole. 4
Moreover, due to the state's generous parole policies, the defen-
dant in Rummel could have been released from prison in as little
as 12 years.65 The defendant's sentence in Solem, life imprison-
ment without any chance at early release on parole was far
66greater.
The State in Solem, however, argued that the defendant in its
case was actually subject to a lesser sentence than in Rummel.67
The Court proceeded to explain the State's argument, and then
reject it:
The State contends that § 22-7-8 [the South Dakota statute] is
more lenient than the Texas habitual offender statute in
Erler's comments criticizing a judge who suppressed a defendant's confession. The only
part of his remarks which has any relevance to the claim that judicial discretion "insulates"
Three Strikes are when he states that "Judicial independence rightly only serves to protect
the Constitution." Id., at 45 WAYNE L. REV. at p. 1417. This is, at best, a cryptic comment
shedding little light on the subject.
59. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
60. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-7-8.
61. Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-282.
62. Id. at 281.
63. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
64. Id. at 279.
65. Id. at 280.
66. Solem specifically distinguished Rummel on the basis that the actual amount of
time the defendant would have to serve in Solem was greater than in Rummel. See Solem,
463 U.S. at 305, n. 32.
67. Id. at 299, n. 26.
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Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is discretionary
rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, how-
ever, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests
that § 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to
fourth-time heroin dealers or other violent criminals. Thus
we do not question the legislature's judgment. Unlike in
Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely con-
sistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment.'
Helm appeared to be stating that the fact that a judge may have
the power to sentence a defendant to less than the maximum
called for under the law is irrelevant because the defendant is not
challenging the statute on its face, as applied to any and every
person charged under its provisions. The defendant is merely
challenging the lawfulness of his own sentence, and the fact that
the judge had power to impose a lesser sentence did not detract
from the fact that he still received the harshest possible sentence
under the law.
In the Three Strikes context, this would mean that the scope
and extent of judges' power to dismiss "strikes" would be irrele-
vant regarding whether the defendants in Andrade and Ewing
received constitutional sentences. These defendants were sen-
tenced to 50-years-to-life and 25-years-to-life in prison, respec-
tively, and their judge's power to impose lesser sentences mat-
tered not one iota to the severity of their sentence.
On the other hand, the availability of means to reduce the sen-
tence in question was something considered by Justice Kennedy in
Harmelin v. Michigan.6 ' As discussed in more detail below," Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion is the controlling one for purposes of the
case.71 Harmelin upheld the constitutionality of a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for a defendant under a Michigan
statute that required such a sentence if the person was found in
possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine."2 The sentence was
68. Id., citing Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1119, 1160 (1979) ("(w]hen a legislature fails to graduate penalties according to recog-
nized degrees of harm, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature expects the sentenc-
ing authorities to mete out punishment that does not exceed the amount proportionate to
the individual offense").
69. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
70. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 962, citing MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 333.7403(2)(1)(i). The defendant in the
Harmelin case was found in possession of 672 grams of cocaine.
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mandatory, meaning the trial judge did not have any discretion to
impose a lesser sentence based on the defendant's individual de-
gree of responsibility.73
Justice Kennedy rejected the defendant's argument that the
constitution required that a judge be given the power to reduce a
sentence based on the defendant's individual characteristics.74
Justice Kennedy found that individualized sentencing considera-
tions were only required in death penalty cases. 5 If individualized
sentencing was required in its case, Justice Kennedy reasoned,
then all mandatory sentencing schemes would be unconstitu-
tional, and such schemes have been upheld for many years."
Justice Kennedy then hedged his bet, stating that "The Michi-
gan scheme does possess mechanisms for consideration of individ-
ual circumstances."77 Although the statutory scheme did not per-
mit judicial discretion, Justice Kennedy pointed out that
"[p]rosecutorial discretion before sentence and executive or legisla-
tive clemency afterwards provide means for the State to avert or
correct unjust sentences."78 Justice Kennedy concluded that in its
case the prosecutor may have chosen to seek the maximum pen-
alty against the defendant because of evidence that the defendant
was a drug dealer.79
Hence, to Justice Kennedy, the ability to consider individualized
circumstances at sentencing, albeit by the prosecutor, not the
judge, ameliorated the severity of the law. The existence and ex-
tent of the ability of a judge to consider individualized sentencing
considerations in a Three Strikes case, and to impose a lesser sen-
tence, appears to be something that Justice Kennedy would find
73. Id. at 1006.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1006-1007.
76. Id. at 1006, quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) (a legisla-
ture "has the power to define criminal punishments without giving courts any sentencing
discretion").
77. Id. at 1008, (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Justice Kennedy indicated that individualized considerations existed to support the
life sentence because the defendant "possessed 672.5 grams of undiluted cocaine and sev-
eral other trappings of a drug trafficker, including marijuana cigarettes, four brass cocaine
straws, a cocaine spoon, 12 Percodan tablets, 25 tablets of Phendimetrazine Tartrate, a
Motorola beeper, plastic bags containing cocaine, a coded address book, and $3,500 in cash."
Id., at p. 1008. The dissenting justices in Solem also pointed to the existence of executive
clemency as an ameliorating aspect of the law. Solem, 463 U.S. at 312, n. 4 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
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important in analyzing the constitutionality of the law."0 The
greater the extent and reach of the power to impose lesser sen-
tences, the less harsh the statute would be; the lesser the power,
the greater the stiffness of the penalty.
Furthermore, the four justices that dissented in Harmelin ap-
parently did place weight on the mandatory nature of the statute
at issue, and the fact that there was no room for judicial discre-
tion. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, where he found that the defendant's sen-
tence was disproportionate under Solem.5' Justice White stated
that he did not reach the issue whether the constitution required
that the statute possess individualized judicial sentencing consid-
erations."2
However, Justice White emphasized the mandatory nature of
the penalty as an integral component to the disproportionality
analysis.' Moreover, Justice White stated in his opinion that the
penalty was "mandatory" no less than ten different times, clearly
placing weight on the lack of judicial discretion to underscore the
harshness of the Michigan statute.'
The dissenting justices in Rummel also indicated that a statute
which provided for judicial discretion would be less harsh than a
mandatory sentencing law. Justice Powell, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, would have held that the life
sentence in Rummel was unconstitutional as meting out dispro-
80. In California's Three Strikes law, a prosecutor does have the power to seek a lesser
sentence, however, the criteria for the prosecutor is the same as that used by the judge: a
prosecutor may seek dismissal of "strike" priors only where there is insufficient evidence to
prove the prior, or "in the furtherance of justice under [CAL. PENAL CODE] Section 1385."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2), (g) (West 2002).
81. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1027 (White, J., dissenting). ("Application of Solem's propor-
tionality analysis leaves no doubt that the Michigan statute as issue fails constitutional
muster."). Justice Marshall stated that he joined in Justice White's dissenting opinion
except to the extent that Justice White concluded that the Eighth Amendment did not
proscribe the death penalty. Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall was of the opinion that capital punishment was cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
82. Id. at 1028, n. 8 ("Because the statute under which petitioner was convicted is un-
constitutional under Solem, there is no need to reach his remaining argument that imposi-
tion of a life sentence without the possibility of parole necessitates the sort of individualized
sentencing determination heretofore reserved for defendants subject to the death penalty").
83. Id. at 1022 (stating in discussing the "harshness of the penalty" that "[tihe manda-
tory sentence of life without the possibility of parole is the most severe punishment the
State could have imposed on any criminal for any crime .... [because] Michigan has no
death penalty," quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 1009-1027.
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portionate punishment to the defendant's crime.85 In concluding
that the punishment of life in prison for commission of a third
non-violent felony was unconstitutional, the dissenting justices
compared the Texas law to those of other jurisdictions, observing
that, unlike Texas, other jurisdictions made life sentences for re-
cidivists discretionary.'
Justice Powell then determined that:
Statutes that permit the imposition of a discretionary life sen-
tence for the commission of three felonies are fundamentally
different from the statute under review in this case. In a dis-
cretionary jurisdiction, the question at sentencing is whether
a three-time felon has engaged in behavior other than the
commission of three felonies that justifies the imposition of
the maximum permissible sentence. In such a jurisdiction,
therefore, other evidence of dangerousness may justify impo-
sition of a life sentence. In Texas, a person receives a manda-
tory life sentence merely because he is a three-time felon.87
One of the California Courts of Appeal which upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Three Strikes law specifically relied on the exis-
tence of judicial discretion in so doing: People v. Mantanez.8" This
case held that "whenever a putatively disproportionately harsh
sentence is specified under the Three Strikes law, it is subject to
judicial modification at sentencing if the sentencing court deems it
appropriate [citing Romero]. This safety valve suffices for consti-
tutional purposes; no greater and more informed wisdom concern-
ing an offender's culpability is, as a matter of course, available to a
reviewing court."89
In sum, the dissenting justices in Rummel and Harmelin con-
cluded that the role of judicial discretion in being able to impose
lesser sentences comes into play in the first inquiry, in weighing
the severity of punishment versus the defendant's culpability.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin, while not criticizing the
85. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 286-287 (Powell, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 299, n. 18, citing Washington D.C. and Idaho statutes as examples.
87. Id. See also Id., at 302, n. 21 (approving the American Bar Association's proposed
recidivist law wherein a defendant could be sentenced to no more than 25 years in prison,
and "The choice of sentence would be left to the discretion of the sentencing court," citing
ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice; Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures §
3.3 (App. Draft 1968)).
88. 98 Cal.App.4th 354 (2002). The case is discussed in greater detail below, infra
notes 279-283 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 367.
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statute at issue for lack of judicial discretion, definitely would
have viewed the existence of discretion as a plus in favor of its
constitutionality. The California Court of Appeal used the exis-
tence of judicial discretion as a prop to support its finding that the
defendant's sentence in its case was not cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.
Since any majority granting relief to the Andrade and Ewing de-
fendants will need the critical votes of Justices Kennedy and Ste-
vens, the degree to which there is or is not judicial discretion to
impose a lesser sentence will be relevant in the Three Strikes
analysis. To analyze the scope of discretion given to California
judges it is important to understand where the power originated,
and how it was subsequently limited. The journey starts with
Romero.
B. Enter Jesus Romero
Given the chance, some judges would act to prevent life sen-
tences for non-serious, non-violent current crimes. Even before
the California Supreme Court decided Romero, California Penal
Code section 1385 was usually the cited source for reducing sen-
tences." Cruel and unusual punishment was also an articulated
ground.91 In contrast to these trial judges, the California Courts of
Appeal that considered the scope of judicial discretion prior to
Romero almost uniformly ruled that courts had no Penal Code sec-
tion 1385 power without the prosecution's consent, some adding,
for good measure, that a sentence of 25-years-to-life did not consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment.92
90. See, e.g., People v. Petty, 37 Cal.App.4th 730 (1995) (rev. gr. S048702). CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1385(a) states, in relevant part, "The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her
own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of jus-
tice, order an action to be dismissed."
91. See, e.g., People v. Bailey, 37 Cal.App.4th 871 (1995) (rev. gr. S048808) (judge found
that a 25-years-to-life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment for a current crime of
commercial burglary).
92. See Petty, 37 Cal.App.4th at 730; Bailey, 37 Cal.App.4th at 871; People v. Patton, 40
Cal.App.4th 413 (1995) (rev. gr. S050625) (25-years-to-life not and unusual punishment for
possession of 1.8 grams of cocaine); People v. Drew, 40 Cal.App.4th 811 (1995) (rev. gr.
S050984); People v. Campos, 38 Cal.App.4th 1669 (1995) (rev. gr. S049828); People v. Su-
perior Court (Missamore), 38 Cal.App.4th 1358 (1995) (rev. gr. S044037); People v. Loomis,
37 Cal.App.4th 1781 (1995) (rev. gr. S049374); People v. Gore, 37 Cal.App.4th 1009 (1995)
(rev. gr.S048866) ( judges cannot dismiss "strikes" under Pen. Code § 1385 without the
prosecution's consent, and 25-years-to-life was not cruel or unusual punishment for posses-
sion of less than one-fifth of a gram of cocaine); People v. Glaster, 36 Cal.App.4th 785
(1995) (rev. gr. S048283). A minority of the Courts of Appeal held that after "strike" priors
were proved, judges had no power to dismiss them without the prosecution's consent, but
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The California Supreme Court granted review in all these
cases.93 The lead opinion was Romero, a case from San Diego. De-
fendant Jesus Romero was caught in possession of .13 of a gram of
cocaine, and he had two "strike" priors: an attempted residential
burglary, and a completed burglary of a residence.' Over the
prosecution's objection, the trial judge dismissed one of the priors
under Penal Code section 1385, and sentenced the defendant to
nine years in state prison.95 The prosecution appealed the sen-
tence, and the Court of Appeal held that courts had no power to
dismiss "strikes" without approval by the prosecution.96 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court agreed to consider the issue.
The supreme court determined that if a defendant has two or
more "strike" priors and commits a new felony, a judge has the
power to sentence the defendant to less than life in prison, pro-
vided that the judge finds that it would be "in furtherance of jus-
tice" to do so." Romero stated that the source of judges' power is
California Penal Code section 1385.
Romero held that a judge can use Penal Code section 1385 to
dismiss, not only an entire case or "action," but also part of an ac-
tion, such as an enhancement for a prior conviction.9 Romero
ruled that a judge could use section 1385 to strike or dismiss a
prior under the Three Strikes law, rendering the defendant pun-
ishable as if the prior was never proved; Romero concluded that
the power to dismiss under section 1385 was neither expressly nor
impliedly abrogated by the Three Strikes law.99
The California Supreme Court cautioned, however, that "A
court's discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in
furtherance of justice is limited. Its exercise must proceed in
strict compliance with section 1385(a), and is subject to review for
that before they were proved, judges did have power. See, People v. Superior Court
(O'Donnell), 40 Cal.App.4th 943 (1995) (rev. gr. S051089); People v. Superior Court (Pip-
kin), 38 Cal.App.4th 1773 (1995) (rev. gr. S049470); People v. Williams, 37 Cal.App.4th
1737 (1995) (rev. gr. S049295).
93. Id.
94. Romero, 13 Cal.4th at 506.
95. The court sentenced the defendant to the maximum allowable for the possession
offense-3 years in prison, doubled the three years using the defendant's remaining "strike"
prior, and added three additional years for the defendant having previously served three
terms in state prison. Romero, 13 Cal.4th at 506.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 519-525.
98. Romero, 13 Cal.4th 497, 508.
99. Id. at 519-525.
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abuse.""' Romero admonished that a judge would act improperly
and be subject to a reversal on appeal if he dismissed "strike" pri-
ors, "guided solely by a personal antipathy for the effect that the
three strikes law would have on [a] defendant, while ignoring de-
fendant's background, the nature of his present offenses, and
other individualized considerations.10
Reaction regarding the impact of Romero was mixed. At the
time the opinion was issued, supporters of the Three Strikes law
uniformly condemned the case as undermining the recidivist
law." Opponents of the law and other commentators believed
that Romero would have a large impact and go a long way towards
preventing unjust sentences. 3 Some were more realistic regard-
ing Romero's impact.' As noted before, in subsequent years sup-
porters of the law have come to rely on Romero as "insulation"
against constitutional attacks.0 5  Other commentators have dis-
agreed.0 '
C. What the High Court giveth, it taketh away ....
What the California Supreme Court acknowledged in Romero, it
largely retracted when it issued its opinion one and a-half years
later in People v. Williams. °7 Williams drove home Romero's ad-
100. Id. at 530.
101. Id. at 531, quotation marks omitted.
102. See Vitiello, supra note 16, at 1649-1652. See also Phoebe Wall Howard, A Blow for
"Three Strikes," FRESNO BEE, June 21, 1996, at Al (Mike Reynolds responded to Romero,
"It breaks my heart .... We've had four years of work on this thing, to get it in place. This
thing has cost us blood, sweat and tears. My daughter's life, our life savings").
103. See John H. Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme Court: 1977-
1997, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1461, 1490 (1998); Comment: Juvenile Justice and the Punishment of
Recidivists Under California's Three Strikes Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1157, 1173-1174 (2002)
(concluding that "Romero has a potentially immense practical impact," and that "applica-
tion of judicial discretion can relieve many individuals from the harsh consequences" of the
statute); Cowart, supra note 47, at 665 (Romero "must be viewed as a chance to rectify the
problems compounded by California's three strikes law").
104. See Raoul V. Mowatt and Hallye Jordan, Unlikely Allies Oppose Revamp of "3
Strikes" Prosecution, Defense Fearful of New Bill, San Jose Mercury News, June 29, 1996 at
Al; See also Vitiello, supra note 15, at 1703, n. 370 (noting Los Angeles County Deputy
Public Defender Alex Ricciardulli and Attorney General Dan Lungren's disagreement with
the host of CNN's Burden of Proof television broadcast of June 24, 1996, that Romero "gut-
ted" the Three Strikes law).
105. See, e.g., Janiskee and Erler, supra note 3, at 65; Erler, supra note 58.
106. See Comment, The "Spirit" of the Three Strikes Law: From the Romero Myth to the
Hopeful Implications of Andrade, 32 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 169, 190-191 (2002) ("While
some argue that the Three Strikes law is a much more defensible law after Romero' s con-
struction,' it is nevertheless difficult to see why in light of the cases that followed," quoting
Janiskee and Erler, supra note 3, at 65).
107. 17 Cal.4th 148 (1998).
Duquesne Law Review
monition that judges could sometimes abuse their discretion in
dismissing "strikes" and reducing sentences.
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of the current offense
of driving under the influence of alcohol with three drunk-driving
priors. °8 This was one of many "wobbler" offenses under Califor-
nia law, punishable either as a felony or misdemeanor, and not
sanctioned as a "serious" offense.19 Ordinarily, if treated as a
misdemeanor, the maximum punishment would have been one
year in jail; but, because California allows driving under the influ-
ence to be considered aggravated if the defendant is a recidivist,
the sentence as a felony could be up to 16 months, two, or three
years in prison."' However, the defendant was subject to the
Three Strikes law because he had two prior convictions, an at-
tempted robbery and a rape."'
The trial judge determined under all of the circumstances that
it would be unjust to sentence the defendant to 25-years-to-life in
prison, so he dismissed one of the defendant's priors, and imposed
a nine-year sentence."' Due to statutory limitations on custody
credits when a defendant receives a doubled sentence under the
Three Strikes law, the defendant would have had to serve 80%, or
approximately seven years of the sentence, before being released
from prison."'
The California Supreme Court in Williams reversed the trial
judge, who had heard and seen witnesses and considered all the
evidence first-hand, holding he abused his discretion in sentencing
the defendant to less than 25-years-to-life."4 Regardless of the
fact that if sentenced to life under the Three Strikes law the de-
fendant would not be eligible for parole until he had spent 25 ac-
tual years in prison,"' Williams held that such a sentence was ap-
propriate for the defendant."6
108. Id. at 155.
109. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17. Other common "wobbler" offenses not considered "seri-
ous" felonies include petty theft with a prior (CAL. PENAL CODE § 666), receiving stolen
property (§ 496), grand theft (§ 487), commercial burglary (§ 459), and possession of meth-
amphetamine (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11377(a)).
110. See CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 23550(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 18; Williams, 17 Cal.4th at
155.
111. Williams, 17 Cal.4th at 153.
112. Id. at 157.
113. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(5).
114. Williams, 17 Cal.4th at 164.
115. See In re Cervera, 24 Cal.4th at 1073.
116. Williams, 17 Cal.4th at 163-164.
Vol. 41
California's Three Strikes Law
Williams articulated the following standard to determine
whether an abuse of discretion has occurred:
[T]he court in question must consider whether, in light of the
nature of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent
felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed out-
117side the [Three Strikes law's] spirit...
The California Supreme Court substituted its judgment for that
of the trial judge, and found nothing favorable or mitigating about
the defendant's current offense of felony drunk driving, and noth-
ing favorable about his priors. Williams went over the defendant's
"background, character, and prospects," and acknowledged that
the defendant had "a stable living arrangement with a woman,
had expressed a desire to help care for their disabled child, and
was still loved, and supported, by his family.""8 However, given
the nature of the defendant's priors, Williams determined that
none of this took him outside the law's "spirit," and directed that
the order dismissing a prior be vacated."9
California Courts of Appeal have joined Williams' restrictive
bandwagon. The Courts of Appeal following Williams have dem-
onstrated that judges' power to dismiss "strikes" is not very po-
tent.
Following Williams, in cases where the defendant's current of-
fense was a "serious" felony, and the judge had shown leniency,
the outcome of the appeals was predictable: the judge was re-
versed because the defendant fell within the "spirit" of the Three
Strikes law. ° Following Williams, even in cases when the current
offense was not serious, and the judge dismissed priors and sen-
tenced a defendant to less than life in prison, the judge was re-
versed; in cases where the current offense was not serious and the
judge refused to dismiss any priors, sentencing the defendant to
life in prison, the judge was affirmed. 2'
117. Id. at 161.
118. Id. at 163.
119. Id.
120. See People v. McGlothin, 67 Cal.App.4th 468 (1998) (current crimes of robbery,
attempted robbery, and misdemeanor battery on an officer); People v. Thornton, 73
Cal.App.4th 42 (1999) (current crimes of burglary and robbery involving a 77-year-old
neighbor).
121. See, e.g., People v. Zichwic, 94 Cal.App.4th 944 (2002) (current offense of burglary of
an automobile); People v. Stone, 75 Cal.App.4th 707 (1999) (current offense of manufactur-
ing PCP); People v. Gaston, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 310 (current offenses of driving a vehicle
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III. CONCRETE INDIVIDUAL EXAMPLES OF INJUSTICE
Good examples of the limit of judicial power can be found in two
cases litigated in Los Angeles County, People v. Taylor,'22 and Peo-
ple v. Gaston. '23 Both cases show that despite non-aggravated
facts and copious mitigating evidence, judges often refuse to exer-
cise their Penal Code section 1385 power, and, when they do, are
likely to be reversed on appeal.
A. People v. Taylor
The defendant in Taylor, committed commercial burglary in
1997 by trying to get into a church to steal food." This was a
"wobbler" offense, punishable by up to one year in jail as a misde-
meanor, and normally no more than three years in prison if sen-
tenced as a felony.'25 However, because two "strike" priors for
robberies, one from 1984, and the other from 1985, were found
true, the defendant was eligible for a life sentence under the Three
Strikes law.'
Associate Justice Earl Johnson Jr. from the California Court of
Appeal described the defendant's case in the following manner: "In
a scenario somewhat reminiscent of a late 2 0 th century, real life
Les Miserables, a hungry, homeless man is sent away for 25 years
to life for trying to break into a church so he could eat some food
he thought the church would be glad for him to have."'27
At the defendant's sentencing on November 20, 1997, the defen-
dant's lawyer pleaded that the trial judge exercise his discretion
under Penal Code section 1385, and not sentence the defendant to
25-years-to-life in prison. The defendant's lawyer argued that the
without the owner's consent and receiving stolen property); People v. Myers, 69
Cal.App.4th 305 (1999) (current offense of possession of a firearm following felony convic-
tion); People v. Cline, 60 Cal.App.4th 1327 (1998) (current offenses of grand theft and com-
mercial burglary).
122. 71 Cal.App.4th 693 (Cal. App. 1999).
123. 74 Cal.App.4th 310 (Cal. App. 1999).
124. Taylor, 71 Cal.App.4th at 695-696.
125. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17, 461(2).
126. Taylor, 71 Cal.App.4th at 694-695; Interview with trial counsel for Mr. Taylor,
Graciela Martinez, Deputy Public Defender, Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office
(Dec. 11, 2001).
127. Taylor, 71 Cal.App.4th at 699, n. 1 (Johnson, J., dissenting); the Court of Appeal
did not address any issues regarding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385, and the appellate case was
subsequently reversed by the California Supreme Court on a claim-of-right ground. See
S079437. The Court of Appeal on remand affirmed the defendant's conviction, again not
reaching any § 1385 issues, and the Supreme Court this time denied review. See S079437.
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defendant's prior convictions were both suffered over 10 years be-
fore the current offense and no weapons were used in the priors.
The lawyer further argued that the current offense was extremely
non-aggravated, and called a priest from the church as a witness
to address the judge."'
Father Allan McCoy requested that the judge not sentence the
defendant to 25-years-to-life in prison. Father McCoy told the
court that he knew the defendant to be a peaceful man, and that it
would not be just or merciful to impose such a sentence on a good
person who made mistakes. 129 Nonetheless, the judge refused to
exercise his discretion to dismiss a "strike" under Romero and Pe-
nal Code section 1385. The judge sentenced the defendant to 25-
years-to-life in prison.13°
B. People v. Gaston
Gaston demonstrates what often happens when a judge decides
to exercise leniency and the prosecution appeals: the case is re-
versed, and the trial judge is ordered to sentence the defendant to
life in prison.
In Gaston, the defendant was convicted of unlawful driving of a
vehicle and receiving stolen property for an incident involving the
defendant's driving a stolen van in 1998.1" Both offenses were
"wobblers," meaning that if they were punished as misdemeanors
the defendant could have been sentenced to no more than one year
in jail for both crimes. 32 If punished as felonies, the defendant
would normally been subject to a maximum of three years in
prison for the two offenses.'33
The defendant, however, had previously been convicted in 1981
of two "strike" priors, a robbery and a kidnaping." He was thus
subject to a sentence of up to 25-years-to-life in prison for the two
current crimes.
The trial judge, after carefully assessing the defendant in per-
son and considering all the facts, exercised discretion under Penal
128. Interview with trial counsel for Mr. Taylor, supra note 126.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Gatson, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 313.
132. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West 1999) and CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West 1999).
133. See CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 10851.29 (West 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 would
have barred the defendant being sentenced more than once for these two closely-related
offenses.
134. Gatson, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 313, 317.
Fall 2002
Duquesne Law Review
Code section 1385. The judge wrote a nine-page typed memoran-
dum justifying his reasons for sentencing the defendant to less
than life in prison. '35 The judge stated in his written order that
the defendant's "strike" priors occurred 17 years ago; that the de-
fendant in his robbery prior was not a major participant or "ring
leader" in the crime, and did not personally cause any physical
harm to the victim; that in the kidnaping prior the defendant had
picked up a girl outside her home and taken her down the street,
with no physical harm to the person; that there were "absolutely
no aggravating aspects" to the defendant's current crime of driving
a stolen van; that the defendant was currently homeless, suffering
from diabetes, and had been raised in a broken home.
The judge carefully exercised his discretion and dismissed the
defendant's 1981 "strike" for robbery to achieve a just sentence.
The judge sentenced the defendant to 10 years, out of which the
defendant would have to serve at least eight years in prison before
being released on parole.
137
The Court of Appeal reversed the judge's dismissal of the defen-
dant's prior conviction. The Court of Appeal found that given the
defendant's criminal record, "as to neither count can Gaston be
'deemed [to be] outside the [Three Strikes] scheme's spirit . .. "'1
Gaston ordered that the defendant serve 25-years-to-life in
prison.'39
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT ROMERO DID NOT
HAVE MUCH IMPACT
There are two sources that indisputably show the impact of
Three Strikes and Romero. One was promulgated a little over a
year following Romero; the other consists of statistics documenting
the breakdown of the state's prison population as of the date of the
this publication.
135. Id., at 318.
136. Id., at 319-320.
137. Id., at 314.
138. Id., at 322, quoting, People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.
139. Gatson, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 322. This was an extremely harsh response from the
Court of Appeal. Even in Williams, the Supreme Court did not directly order the trial
judge to impose a maximum sentence. Williams stated, "On remand here, if the material
and information set out again prove to be the same as that set out before, the superior court
cannot rule as it did originally, inasmuch as its order was erroneous. But if such material
and information turn out different, it is not so bound." Williams, 17 Cal.4th at 164, n. 7.
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A. The Legislative Analyst's Report and its significance
The California Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) is an impartial
government entity overseen by a 16-member, bipartisan commit-
tee in the California Legislature. The LAO 'as been providing
fiscal and policy advice to the Legislature for more than 55 years.
It is known for its fiscal and programmatic expertise and nonpar-
tisan analyses of the state's budget."4 °
On October 14, 1997, the LAO published a report entitled, "The
'Three Strikes and You're Out' Law: An Update." 4 1 The report
documented the number of defendants who had been sentenced to
prison under the Three Strikes law for life, so-called "third strik-
ers," and for doubled sentences, referred to in the report as "sec-
ond strikers."'
One of the report's observations,4 1 was that "Slightly more than
half of third strikers were admitted to prison for a violent or seri-
ous offense."'" Put another way, the LAO Report concluded that
roughly one-half of the defendants serving life sentences under the
Three Strikes law committed non-serious and non-violent current
offenses to trigger their life sentences.
The most relevant observation by the LAO for present purposes
deals with the number of defendants serving life sentences under
Three Strikes before judges were given power to dismiss "strikes"
on June 6, 1996, and thereafter. The LAO noted that "about 120
third-strikers [are] admitted to prison each month." 45 The LAO
observed that, as of the date of the report's publication in October
1997, "The number of third-strikers admitted to prison monthly
has increased only slightly in the past two years." '
The LAO then concluded, "The number has changed little since
the Romero decision." 147 The LAO provided a graphic chart show-
ing the number of defendants being sentenced to prison before
Romero was issued in June 1996, and after.1' As the LAO noted,
140. Information about the Legislative Analyst's Office, available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/laofacts.html.
141. See Appendix A, hereafter "LAO Report."
142. LAO Report, supra note 140, at 1.
143. This is fully substantiated by the statistics reproduced in Appendices B1-B5 and
discussed in the next section of this Article.
144. LAO Report, supra note 140, at 2.






there was not much change in the numbers even after judges were
given power to not sentence defendants to life in prison.
This was a significant conclusion. Prior to Romero being issued,
some case law existed regarding judges' power to sentence defen-
dants to less than the maximum provided by Three Strikes."9 The
vast majority of cases from the State Courts of Appeal, however,
had ruled that judges had no power to dismiss "strikes" and im-
pose lesser sentences unless the prosecution consented.'6 °
Presumably, when the California Supreme Court issued Ro-
mero, more judges should have started using their newly-given
authority, resulting in fewer defendants being sentenced to life in
prison on a month-by-month basis. Yet, the LAO could find no
appreciable change in the number of defendants coming to prison
on life sentences. The LAO's conclusion that the number of defen-
dants being sentenced to life in prison since Romero had "changed
little,""' underscores this Article's conclusion that the existence of
judicial power has not greatly affected the application of the Three
Strikes law.
B. The Department of Correction's statistics
The California Department of Corrections (DOC) is the govern-
ment institution in charge of administering California' vast penal
system. It runs 33 state prisons, with a total inmate population of
157,979 as of the end of the third quarter of 2002.12
The DOC website provides summaries of the most current sta-
tistical information about the DOC, its budget, programs, and fa-
cilities. It also maintains extensive statistics on the composition
of its inmate population, including statistics regarding defendants
serving time under the Three Strikes law.1
3
This Article first explains the methodology used to analyze the
statistics from the DOC, then presents an analysis of the statistics
themselves, and an explanation of their significance.
149. See supra, note 92. The Courts of Appeal in People v. Superior Court (O'Donnell),
40 Cal.App.4th at 943; People v. Superior Court (Pipkin), 38 Cal.App.4th at 1773; and Peo-
ple v. Williams, 37 Cal.App.4th at 1737 had ruled that until a "strike" was proved, a judge
had power to dismiss it even over the prosecution's objection.
150. See supra note 92.
151. See LAO Report, supra note 140, at 5.
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1. Notes on methodology
Currently available on the DOC website are statistics regarding
defendants serving doubled sentences and life sentences under the
Three Strikes law starting from September 30, 2001.1' The DOC
has been publishing statistics on Three Strikes from well before
this date.155
The relevant statistics list offenses which triggered a life sen-
tence under the Three Strikes law. These statistics corroborate
the LAO's observation that approximately one-half of the defen-
dants serving life sentences under Three Strikes are in due to non-
serious current offenses. '56 The statistics also show that the per-
centage of defendants serving life due to non-serious offenses -
including the offenses at issue before the United States Supreme
Court in the Andrade and Ewing cases, petty theft with a prior
and grand theft'57- has not changed significantly before and after
Romero was issued.
The DOC separates defendants' crimes into 33 categories of of-
fenses, including murder, robbery, rape, and kidnapping, as well
as non-aggravated crimes like petty theft with a prior, non-
vehicular grand theft, commercial/vehicular burglary, and posses-
sion of controlled substances for personal use. The DOC also pro-
vides categories titled "Missing," which denotes defendants for
which it could not find the type of crime committed, and "Other
offenses," which signifies crimes falling within none of the 33
enumerated categories.'
In order to provide percentages of defendants serving life in
prison at different times in the past, this Article separated the
categories provided by the DOC between types of crimes which are
categorized by California law as "serious" and "non-serious" of-
154. Id.
155. Statistics on file with author dating back to May 1996.
156. See LAO Report, at p. 2.
15. 7. See Andrade v. California Attorney General, No. 01-1127; Ewing v. California,
No. 01-6978.
158. The number of defendants within the categories of "Missing" and "Other offenses" is
very small. For example, the statistics as of May 31, 1996, reproduced in Appendix B1,
noted 45 defendants as "Missing," and 24 in "Other offenses" out of a total of 1,891 defen-
dants serving life in prison under Three Strikes. For the statistical percentages calculated




fenses. 159 Serious crimes are listed in California Penal Code sec-
tion 1192.7(c). 60
Serious felonies are crimes which are aggravated and usually
involve violence.16 1 California's Three Strikes law has designated
these crimes as sufficiently aggravated so that if a defendant has
previously been convicted of one or more of them, the defendant
must be given enhanced punishment upon committing a new fel-
162ony.
2. The DOC statistics on Three Strikes
The most important statistics available are those from the
month before Romero was issued in June 1996, and dates subse-
quent thereto.'6
(i) May 31, 1996
As of May 31, 1996, DOC statistics show that there were 1,822
defendants serving life in prison under Three Strikes for identifi-
able offenses.' 53.4% of the total defendants serving life were
committed due to non-serious current offenses. Of the total num-
ber of defendants, 114, or 6.3% were incarcerated for petty theft
with a prior, 6' the same offense at issue in Andrade. In 24, or
1.3% of the cases, the current offense was non-vehicular grand
theft,166 the offense at issue in Ewing. Other notable categories
159. See supra note 42 for "serious" felony list, and note 43 for the list of "violent" felo-
nies.
160. See supra note 42.
161. There are several exceptions, however. For example, CAL. PENAL CODE §
1192.7(c)(6) lists any "lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14." This crime can
be committed without any force or violence. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288. The same is true
for CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(24), selling narcotics to children. See Health and Safety
Code §§ 11055(d), 11055(f)(1)(A). Burglary of a residence, even when no person is home is
also listed, § 1192.7(c)(18). Although no violence need be involved in committing burglary,
there is the potential for violence in entering another person's house to commit a crime.
Under this reasoning, both lewd acts on a child and selling drugs to children involve the
potential for violence because it is easy to see how a parent or other bystander could react
violently if they witnessed these heinous crimes.
162. The Three Strikes law also counts "violent" felonies listed in CAL. PENAL CODE §
667.5(c), and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b), as "strike" priors; however, as previously
noted, supra, note 45 and accompanying text, virtually all § 607.5(c) and § 707(b), priors are
included within the "serious" felony list in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c).
163. Romero was issued on June 20, 1996. See 13 Cal.4th at 497.
164. May 31, 1996, DOC Statistics, reproduced in Appendix B1; see supra note 158; 45
defendants listed as "Missing" and 24 in "Other offenses" were subtracted from this total.
165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 666.
166. CAL. PENAL CODE § 487.
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included commercial/vehicular burglary,6 ' which constituted 168
cases, or 9.2% of the total; and possession of controlled substances
for personal use,'68 which fell in at 186 cases, or 10.2% of the to-
tal.
169
(ii) September 30, 1997
As of September 30, 1997, a little over a year after Romero was
issued, the total number of defendants serving life in prison under
Three Strikes for identifiable offenses was 3,537, nearly double
what it had been in May of 1996.17' The percentage of defendants
serving life for non-serious offenses dropped from May 1996, but
not significantly.
As of September 30, 1997, 48.4% of the total defendants serving
life were there due to non-serious current offenses. Of this total,
in 197, or 5.6% of the cases, the current offense was petty theft
with a prior; 36, or 1.0% of the cases, the current offense was non-
vehicular grand theft; in 278, or 7.9% of the cases, the current of-
fenses were commercial/vehicular burglaries; and in 344 cases, or
9.7%, the current offense was possession of controlled substances
for personal use. 7 '
(iii) May 31, 1999
As of May 31, 1999, nearly three years after Romero was issued,
the total number of defendants serving life in prison under Three
Strikes for identifiable offenses was 5,176.17'2 47.3% of the total
defendants serving life were there due to non-serious current of-
fenses. Of this total, in 274, or 5.3% of the cases, the current of-
fense was petty theft with a prior; in 71 cases, or 1.4%, the current
offense was non-vehicular grand theft; 364, or 7.0% of the cases
(364) were commercial/vehicular burglaries; and in 525 cases, or
10.1%, the current offense was possession of controlled substances
for personal use.'
7
167. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459.
168. CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 11350.
169. See Appendix B1, May 31, 1996, DOC Statistics.
170. The September 31, 1997, DOC Statistics are reproduced in Appendix B2.
171. See Appendix B2, September 30, 1997, DOC Statistics.
172. The May 31, 1999, DOC Statistics are reproduced in Appendix B3.
173. See Appendix B3, May 31, 1999, DOC Statistics.
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(iv) August 31, 2000
As of August 31, 2000, the total number of defendants serving
life in prison under Three Strikes for identifiable offenses was
6,189.174 46.8% of the total defendants serving life were there due
to non-serious current offenses. Of this total, in 323 of the cases,
or 5.2%, the current offense was petty theft with a prior; in 96, or
1.6% of the cases, the current offense was non-vehicular grand
theft; 426, or 6.9% were commercial/vehicular burglaries; and in
616, or 10.0% of the cases, the current offense was possession of
controlled substances for personal use.
(v) June 30, 2002
Finally, under the latest available statistics, as of June 30,
2002, the total number of defendants serving life in prison under
Three Strikes for identifiable offenses was 7,148.176 42.7% of the
total defendants serving life were there due to non-serious current
offenses. Of this total, in 344 cases, or 4.8%, the current offense
was petty theft with a prior; in 115 of the cases, or 1.6%, the cur-
rent offense was non-vehicular grand theft; 457 cases, or 6.4%,
were commercial/vehicular burglaries; and in 647 cases, or 9.1%,
the current offense was possession of controlled substances for
personal use.177
3. The significance of the statistics
Although relatively small, there were two cognizable drops in
the percentage of defendants serving life for non-serious crimes:
from 1996 to 1997, and again from 2000 to 2002.
The first decrease, however, can be explained as judges using
their limited Penal Code section 1385 power to retroactively re-
sentence defendants. The second decrease likely had nothing to
do with judges' power. The second decrease was undoubtedly at-
tributable to the charging practice of a new District Attorney
elected in November 2000 in Los Angeles County, and the effect of
Proposition 36, a voter-approved change in the law also effectu-
ated in November 2000.
174. The August 31, 2000, DOC Statistics are reproduced in Appendix B4.
175. See Appendix B4, August 31, 2000, DOC Statistics.
176. The June 30, 2002, DOC Statistics are reproduced in Appendix B5.
177. See Appendix B5, June 30, 2002, DOC Statistics.
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The vast numbers of defendants who are to this day being com-
mitted to prison for non-serious offenses strongly indicates that
the existence of power under Penal Code section 1385 does not
detract from the extreme severity of the punishment provided by
the Three Strikes law. Penal Code section 1385 is no solution to
the injustice perpetrated by California's law.
(i) The 1996-1997 decrease
There was a drop in the percentage of non-serious defendants
serving life in prison under Three Strikes from May 1996 to Sep-
tember 1997: the numbers fell from 53.6% to 48.4%, a 5.2% drop.
Yet, the numbers for subsequent years from 1997 to 2000 do not
reflect any other significant drops. In fact, these statistics from
1997 (48.4%) to 2000 (46.8%) do not show a marked decrease.
Likewise, the drop in percentages of individual non-serious
crimes between 1996 to 1997, was not replicated in the years from
1997 to 2000. Between 1996 and 1997 the percentage of defen-
dants serving life for petty theft dropped from 6.3% to 5.6%; but
between 1997 and 2000, the drop was only from 5.6% to 5.2%. The
percentage of defendants whose current offense was grand theft
actually increased from 1997 to 2000, from 1.0% to 1.6%, and the
percentage of defendants whose current offense was possession of
drugs for personal use also rose, from 9.7% to 10%.
The 1996-1997 drop can best be explained as judges using their
limited power to correct sentences from before 1996. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court specifically rendered its opinion in Romero
"fully retroactive," allowing judges to re-sentence defendants if
they now believed that a life sentence would not be in furtherance
of justice.'78 The 5.2% drop in the number of defendants serving
life for non-serious offenses thus was probably due to the use of
judges' power to correct past sentences. The percentage of defen-
dants serving life for non-serious crimes remained fairly steady
subsequently until after 2000.
(ii) The 2000-2002 decrease
The drop in the percentage of non-serious defendants serving
life from August 2000 to June 2002, was from 46.8% to 42.7%, a
4.1% drop. The percentage of defendants serving life for petty
178. See Romero, 13 Cal.4th at 530, n. 13.
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theft between 2000 to 2002 dropped from 5.2% to 4.9%; the per-
centage of defendants whose current offense was grand theft
slightly dipped from 1.6% to 1.5%; and the percentage of defen-
dants whose current offense was possession of drugs for personal
use dropped from 10% to 9.2%.
The 2000-2002 drop was almost certainly due to two develop-
ments. First was the election in November 2000, of Steve Cooley
as the Los Angeles County District Attorney. Mr. Cooley insti-
tuted a policy whereby defendants whose current offense is a non-
serious crime are presumed not to be eligible for a life sentence
under the Three Strikes law.179 Since Los Angeles is the largest
county in California, and the source of the greatest percentage of
Three Strikes defendants, Mr. Cooley's policy has undoubtedly
had an impact on the drop in defendants serving life sentences
under the law.
The other development was the enactment of Proposition 36 by
the voters of California. Proposition 36, codified in California Pe-
nal Code section 1210, et seq., requires that defendants convicted
of possession of drugs for their personal use be given probation
and drug treatment instead of incarceration. Even defendants
who have "strike" priors on their record are eligible for Proposition
36, provided they have satisfied a five-year "washout" since the
conviction of their priors.8 ' The advent of Proposition 36 si-
phoned-off some defendants who would have otherwise received
life sentences.
(iii) The numbers of defendants serving life reflect the se-
verity of the law
The life sentences meted out to the thousands of defendants who
are currently in prison under the Three Strikes law for non-
serious current cases effectively rebuts any argument that the
power to dismiss "strikes" has performed as a "safety valve" pre-
venting unjust sentences.' The power to dismiss "strikes" is not a
remedy to the problems with the law.
Despite the existence of judicial power to dismiss "strikes" and
to sentence defendants to less than life in prison, as documented
by the latest statistics from the DOC, a whopping 42.7% the total
179. See L.A. D.A. Website available at http'//da.co.la.ca.us/mr/2000/121900b.htm.
180. See CAL. PENAL CODE, § 1210.1(b)(1); People v. Superior Court (Jefferson), 97
Cal.App.4th 530 (2002).
181. See supra notes 3 and 98 and accompanying text.
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number of defendants serving life were there due to non-serious
current offenses. 182 That comes out to about 3,052 persons whose
current crime was non-serious, including 344 petty thieves, and
115 defendants who committed grand theft.
These numbers speak volumes regarding judges' power to dis-
miss "strikes": in the types of cases which would most likely war-
rant a reduction from a life sentence, where the current offense is
a non-serious offense, thousands of cases ended with no judicial
reduction under Penal Code section 1385. Judges' power to reduce
sentences has not impacted California's Three Strikes law in any
significant way.
V. IF NOT WITH JUDICIAL DISCRETION, WHERE DOES
MERCY RESIDE?
Judicial discretion has not proven to be a panacea. The fact
that judges in California have power to reduce sentences under
Penal Code section 1385 certainly did not help the defendants in
Andrade and Ewing, who both received life sentences, and the
same is true of the thousands of defendants currently serving life
in prison for non-serious crimes.
Only ameliorative legislation or an opinion with categorical
sweep will alleviate the problem with Three Strikes. The second
option appears more realistic than the first.
A. Abandon all hope ye who enter the legislative arena
Attempts to amend or limit the Three Strikes law have been a
dismal failure. These date back to the abortive effort to place an-
other proposition on the ballot to compete with the Three Strikes
Initiative in 1993.83 Since then, every legislative year attempts
have been made to pass laws amending Three Strikes."8
182. See Appendix B5, June 30, 2002, DOC Statistics.
183. See supra note 38.
184. A.B. 1444 (Kuehl), 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1996), would also have provided
that the current offense for the purposes of the Three Strikes law had to be a "serious" or
violent felony. In January 1996, A.B. 1444 failed passage in the Assembly Public Safety
Committee. S.B. 2089 (Marks), 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1996) likewise would have
required the current offense to be "serious" or "violent" for a defendant to get a life sen-
tence. In May 1996, the bill failed passage in the Senate by a 20 to 14 vote. S.B. 1317
(Lee), 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1998), would also have required the current offense to be
a "serious" or "violent" felony to trigger the life sentence. In May 1997, S.B. 1317 failed
passage on the Senate Floor by a 25 to 13 vote. S.B. 2048 (Vasconcellos), 1997-1998 Reg.
Sess. 2 (Cal. 1998), started out as a bill that would have required the current offense to be a
.serious" or "violent" felony to trigger a life sentence. The bill was then amended to author-
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The 2002 session saw no less than three such forays. All came
to naught. There were two modest attempts at reform, and a more
radical one.
S.B. 1517 was one of the modest bills.8 ' It would have limited
the impact of the Three Strikes law by providing that specified
felonies can no longer trigger either the doubling provision of the
law or the provision that imposes a 25-years-to-life sentence.
Felonies such as possession of controlled substances for personal
use;'86 perjury; preparing false evidence; forgery; counterfeiting;
grand theft; receiving stolen property; eavesdropping; circulating
false money or paper; failure to disclose origin of recordings; filing
false tax returns; filing false or no information relating to unem-
ployment taxes; and related crimes.87 Since the bill would have
directly amended the Three Strikes law, it required a vote of two
thirds of both the Assembly and Senate to be enacted.188 S.B. 1517
did not even come close to passing, being defeated in the Senate by
a 20 to 14 vote.
S.B. 1719 was another modest bill. 89  It fared no better. It
would have barred the application of the Three Strikes law when
the current crime was petty theft with priors or commercial bur-
glary. It would have done this by making commercial burglary a
straight misdemeanor when the crime is committed by entering
ize a study of the cost and benefits of the Three Strikes law. In August 1998, S.B. 2048 was
approved by the Legislature, (in the Assembly by a 41 to 31 vote, in the Senate, by a 23 to
12 vote). The bill was then vetoed by Governor Pete Wilson. S.B. 79 (Hayden), 1999-2000
Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1998), would initially have required the current offense to be a "serious"
or "violent" felony to trigger the life sentence. S.B. 79 was then amended on July 8, 1999,
to create a "task force" composed of community leaders to study the Three Strikes law. In
January 2000, the bill failed in the Senate by a 14 Ayes to 16 Noes vote. A.B. 2447
(Wright), 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2000) started out as bill that would have required
the current offense to be a "serious" or "violent" felony in order for the life sentence to be
imposed. The bill was then amended to require a judge in determining whether to dismiss
a prior under Penal Code section 1385 to give "Great weight in favor of striking a prior
conviction" when the current felony was neither "serious" or "violent." In June 2000, A.B.
2447 failed passage on the Assembly Floor by 47 to 24 vote. A.B. 1652 (Goldberg),
2000-2001 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2001), would have prohibited a felony conviction for the simple
possession of a controlled substance from being used as a second or third "strike" for the
purpose of the Three Strikes law. In January 2002, A.B. 1652 was substantially amended
on the Assembly floor into unrelated subject matter.
185. S.B. 1517 (Polanco), 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2002).
186. This included possession of cocaine, heroin, and, in the final version of the bill,
methamphetamine. See S.B. 1517, as amended April 1, 2002.
187. Id.
188. See CAL. PENAL CODE, § 667(j) (specifying that "The provisions of [the Three Strikes
law] shall not be amended by the Legislature except by statute passed in each house by
rollcall vote entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring...
189. S.B. 1719 (Sher), 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2002).
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"any retail establishment during business hours with the intent to
commit petty theft."9 ' It would also have made all petty thefts
with priors straight misdemeanors.19' Since the Three-Strikes law
requires a felony to trigger its application, this bill would have
effectively barred the law from applying to these cases.'92 Addi-
tionally, only a majority vote would have been required for ap-
proval because the bill would not have directly amended the Three
Strikes law.'93 No matter; needing at least 21 votes for approval
under Senate rules, it lost by garnering only 16 out of 31 votes.'94
Finally, the most radical attempt to amend the law was A.B.
1790.15 This broad bill would have required that the current of-
fense that triggers a doubled sentence or 25-years-to-life in prison
must be a "serious" or "violent" felony.96 The bill would have been
fully retroactive for defendants serving life sentences, requiring
that defendants who were found guilty or pled guilty and were
serving 25-years-to-life sentences under the old law be brought
back to court for resentencing.
1 7
Adopting a different tack than the two previous bills, A.B. 1790
provided that it would only become effective if approved by Cali-
fornia's voters at the November 2002 election.'98 Assemblymember
Jackie Goldberg's bill got out of the Assembly Committee on Pub-
190. Currently, commercial burglary is a "wobbler," punishable as a felony or misde-
meanor, regardless of the type of establishment at issue and whether the location is open
for business. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17, 461.
191. Currently petty theft with priors are also "wobblers." See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17,
666.
192. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e).
193. See S.B. 1719, as amended April 23, 2002 (wherein the Legislative Counsel's Digest
specified "Vote: majority" for its approval requirement).
194. See Cal. Senate Rules, reproduced in the Cal. Senate website found as of Oct. 16,
2002 available at http://www.sen.ca.gov/-newsen/schedulesbill2law.htp.
195. A.B. 1790 (Goldberg), 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2002).
196. As originally introduced, the bill was even broader: it would have reduced the type
of crimes that count as "strike" priors and as current offenses by eliminating the following
crimes which currently do count as "strike" priors and, of course, as current felonies: at-
tempts or conspiracies to commit serious or violent felonies; residential burglaries where no
one was home; terrorist threats; intimidation of witnesses; crimes on behalf of a gang; and
grand theft of a firearm. See A.B. 1790, as introduced Jan. 14, 2002. A subsequent
amendment deleted these proposed changes. See A.B. 1790, as amended Mar. 7, 2002.
197. See A.B. 1790, as amended April 25, 2002. The bill would not have been made
retroactive for persons merely serving doubled sentences under the Three Strikes law. See
A.B. 1790, § 4 ("A person who was convicted of a felony and is currently serving an inde-
terminate term of life in prison may make a written motion before the trial court that en-
tered the judgment of conviction in his or her case, for resentencing . . ").
198. Id., § 5 (specifying that the provisions of the bill "shall become effective only when
submitted to, and approved by, the voters of California....").
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lic Safety, 99 but it was referred to the Assembly Appropriations
Committee, and failed to come up for a vote before the Legislature
convened August 30, 2002.200 This effectively killed the bill.
The initiative process has proven no kinder to the foes of Three
Strikes. Most recently, the "Three Strikes Act of 2002" failed to
secure enough signatures to make it onto the ballot.20 ' This initia-
tive was similar to A.B. 1790, but would have gone even farther in
changing current sentencing laws. The initiative would have
permitted the sentence of 25-to-life to be imposed only in cases
where the defendant had two or more "serious and/or violent felo-
nies," as defined, and committed a current "serious and/or violent
felony.02 It would have required that a defendant's sentence be
doubled only when the defendant has one "serious and/or violent
felony," and commits a new "serious and/or violent felony" of-
fense.2"' It would also have limited the five-year enhancement 0 4 to
priors and current crimes in the new definition of "serious and/or
violent felonies."2 5
The proposed initiative would have also greatly reduce the type
of crimes that count as "serious" and/or "violent" felonies for pur-
poses of receiving a 25-to-life sentence, a doubled sentence, and a
five-year enhancement.2°  The initiative would have eliminated
the following crimes from the current "serious felony" list: arson;
exploding a destructive device with intent to injure; all residential
burglaries; an attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or
life in prison; any felony where the defendant personally used a
deadly or dangerous weapon; grand theft of a firearm; crimes on
behalf of a gang; assault with intent to commit rape; throwing
acid; assault with a firearm or on a police officer or firefighter;
terrorist threats; intimidation of witnesses; and all attempts or
conspiracies to commit serious or violent felonies.2 7
199. The bill passed by a 4-2 vote.
200. Id.




204. Five-year priors are currently in CAL. PENAL CODE §667(a).
205. Proposed Initiative SA2001RF0043.
206. The current "violent" felony list is reproduced supra note 43; the current list of
"serious" felonies is in supra note 42.
207. Proposed Initiative SA2001RF0043. The initiative would have also limited the
number of usable "strikes" by prohibiting more than a single "strike" prior resulting from a
single past case, regardless of how many counts the defendant was convicted in the case.
Id.
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Finally, the proposed initiative would have required that defen-
dants who were found guilty or pled guilty and were serving sen-
tences under the previous sentencing laws be brought back to
court for resentencing.2°s This would have included both defen-
dants sentenced to life in prison, like A.B. 1790, and, defendants
serving doubled terms or terms enhanced with five-year priors
which no longer counted as priors.2 0 9 The defendant would have
had a right to be resentenced within 180 days of the approval of
the initiative by the voters.21 °
Unsurprisingly, this hopelessly ambitious proposal failed to
qualify for the ballot.21' Nevertheless, perhaps the initiative proc-
ess is not a total dead end.
Hope for change via the initiative route can be found in Califor-
nia voters' approval in November 2000 of Proposition 36.21 Under
Proposition 36, defendants convicted on or after July 1, 2001, of
possession or transportation for personal use of controlled sub-
stances must be sentenced to probation and drug treatment.
Eligible defendants cannot be sentenced to prison or jail unless
they violate probation.21 '4 This initiative reduced punishment for
many drug addicts, including some Three Strikers.215
Proposition 36 was approved by 61% of the voters despite argu-
ments by its opponents that it would weaken the Three Strikes
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. The "Findings" section of the proposed initiative stated that 35,000 defendants
would be eligible for resentencing.
211. See http'//www.caag.state.ca.us/initiatives/inactiveindex.htm, June 25, 2002 up-
date.
212. Proposition 36 was codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.
213. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(a).
214. Id.
215. So long as a defendant has remained free of prison custody, free from committing
any non-drug possession felonies; and free from committing any violent misdemeanors for
at least five years, the fact that the defendant has one of more "strike" priors on his record
will not disqualify him from Prop. 36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(b)(1). Appellate
courts, however, have interpreted this provision to require that a defendant have remained
free for the five years immediately preceding the commission of the current drug offense, as
opposed to having any five-year period between being released from prison on the "strike"
and commission of the current offense. See People v. Superior Court (Jefferson), 97
Cal.App.4th at 530; People v. Superior Court (Turner), 97 Cal.App.4th 1222 (2002); and
People v. Superior Court (Henkel), 98 Cal.App.4th 78 (2002). Thus, the appellate courts
narrowed the number of defendants with "strike" priors that are eligible for Prop. 36. The
issue whether judges have power to dismiss "strike" priors under Penal Code section 1385
to render defendants eligible under Prop. 36 is currently before the California Supreme
Court in People v. Varnell, 95 Cal.App.4th 205 (2002) rev. gr. S104614.
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law.216 This arguably shows that California voters may be soften-
ing their stand on criminals and recidivists.2"
Yet, there was one factor favoring passage of Proposition 36
which proponents of an anti-Three Strikes initiative could not
count on: money. Proposition 36 was heavily funded by a group of
people, including multi-millionaire New York philanthropist
George Soros, who are interested in criminal justice issues relat-
ing to illegal drugs."' There has been no indication that this
group would be willing to fund an initiative to overturn Three
Strikes.219 It seems more likely that Prop. 36 was the product of a
well-funded special interest campaign than a sea change in voters'
attitudes towards crime and punishment.
B. Hope from the U.S. Supreme Court?
Handicapping how the U.S. Supreme Court will rule in Andrade
and Ewing is very difficult. Four justices have previously gone on
record expressing serious reservations and concerns with Califor-
216. See Andrew Lamar and Claire Booth, Rewriting the Rules for Drug Users: Court
Officials and Police Fear Prop. 36 will Prevent Prosecution of Offenders, CONTRA COSTA
TiMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at Al; accord, Alex Ricciardulli, Criminal Crossroads, Uncertainty at
the Intersection of Three Strikes and Proposition 36, L.A. DAILY J., Sep. 24, 2001, at 7.
217. The fact that the voters enacted Proposition 21 in March of 2000, a mere eight
months previous to Prop. 36's approval in November, undercuts this argument. Prop. 21
was very punitive, allowing prosecutors to charge juveniles as adults without judicial ap-
proval, and adding 24 new "strike" priors to the adult and juvenile lists of priors. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (priors for making terrorist threats, committing felonies on behalf
of a gang, and witness intimidation, among other crimes, added to "serious" felony list; CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (priors for unarmed robbery and voluntary manslaughter,
among others, added to juvenile priors list).
218. See Lamar and Booth, supra note 216. Opponents of Prop. 36 complained after its
enactment that the Soros group "came in from New York with 3 million bucks... We had
no money." Id. The group successfully sponsored and got enacted California's Medicinal
Marijuana Initiative, Proposition 215, which created an affirmative defense for persons
using and possessing marijuana to alleviate suffering from medical conditions. Jane Rob-
inson, Pot Shots; Marijuana Maven Offers Good Test For State Measure, L.A. DAILY J., Aug.
3, 1997, Viewpoint Section. Soros donated $350,000 to help supporters gather signatures
and put Prop. 215 on the ballot, and the initiative passed by 56% of the vote. Id. The group
also funded successful ballot propositions similar to Proposition 36 and the Medicinal Mari-
juana Initiative enacted in several other states. See Drug Reform Initiatives Do Well In
States, THE BULLETIN FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 9, 2000.
219. The Soros group could become involved if it became aware of large numbers of de-
fendants have been sentenced to life in prison under Three Strikes for drug offenses. DOC
statistics show that 1,230 defendants are serving at least 25 years-to-life under Three
Strikes for narcotics charges. See Appendix B5, June 30, 2002, DOC Statistics (the largest
group, by far, is for possession of controlled substances for personal use: 647). Since Propo-
sition 36's provisions have been held to not apply to already-sentenced defendants (see
People v. Floyd, 95 Cal.App.4th 1092, rev. gr. S105225), an initiative targeting this group of
drug addicted defendants might pique Soros' interest.
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nia's Three Strikes law.220 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia are firmly entrenched in favor of giving deference to state
laws which are highly punitive. 21 Presumably, Justice Thomas
would also fall in with Rehnquist and Scalia on this issue.
That leaves Justices Kennedy and O'Connor as the key swing
votes. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, made his po-
sition known in his concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.2
Under the so-called Rule of Harmelin,222 a court must first com-
pare a defendant's punishment to his crimes to determine if there
is an inference of "gross disproportionality."224 If there is no such
inference, the analysis stops at this point, and the statute is found
220. In Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999) (mem.), Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg concurred in the denial of certiorari in a case where the defendant received a life
sentence under the Three Strikes law for stealing a bottle of vitamins from a market.
However, they did so because "Neither the California Supreme Court nor any federal tribu-
nal has yet addressed the question" of the constitutionality of such a sentence, stating that
the case "raises a serious question concerning the application of California's 'three strikes'
law... to petty offenses. Id. Justice Breyer dissented from the certiorari denial, agreeing
that the "petition for certiorari raises a serious question concerning the application of a
'three-strikes' law to what is in essence a petty offense," but believing that the issue should
be taken up immediately. Id. In Durden v. California, 531 U.S. 1184 (2000), Justices
Souter and Breyer dissented from the denial of certiorari in a case where a defendant re-
ceived a life sentence for stealing $43 worth of goods. The two justices expressed frustra-
tion that "Two years after Riggs, the Supreme Court of California has not taken up the
issue," and that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet reviewed the constitutional-
ity of Three Strikes. Id.
221. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 962-965 (Opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia believe that the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality principle applies only to capital sentencing; it does not apply
to review the constitutionality of the length of a sentence. The full extent of this position
becomes apparent when one considers that in Rummel, 445 U.S. at 263, although a major-
ity of the justices refused to analyze the constitutionality of a statute for disproportionate
punishment, even they concluded, "This is not to say that a proportionality principle would
not come into play in [an] extreme example . . . if a legislature made overtime parking a
felony punishable by life imprisonment." Id. at 274, n. 11. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Harmelin would oppose reviewing the constitutionality of even the hypotheti-
cal parking violation life sentence statute. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986, n. 11 (Scalia, J.)
(arguing that if "overtime parking should one day become an arguably major threat to the
common good, and the need to deter it arguably critical... [m]embers of this Court would
probably disagree as to whether the punishment really is 'disproportionate,' " emphasis in
original).
222. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Justices O'Connor and
Souter). Justice Souter has made his position on the Three Strikes law known by question-
ing the validity of the law in Riggs and Durden.
223. Justice Kennedy's opinion is known as "the rule of Harmelin" because it is the "po-
sition taken by those Members [of the Supreme Court] who concurred in the judgment[] on
the narrowest grounds.. . ." United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128-129 (9th Cir. 1992).
224. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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constitutional.225 If an inference of "gross disproportionality" is
found, a court makes two comparisons: the court compares the
sentence the defendant received to punishment imposed for other
crimes in the jurisdiction being reviewed; and the court also com-
pares the defendant's sentence to punishment imposed in other
jurisdictions.226
In Andrade and Ewing the Supreme Court will analyze the facts
of the cases before it, and apply the rules of its previous opinions.
The defendant in Andrade stole videotapes from K-Mart stores on
two separate occasions in 1995, $84.70 in one theft, and $68.84 in
another two weeks later.2 7 The defendant had three "strike" pri-
ors for residential burglaries suffered in 1983. In addition to the
"strikes," the defendant had two misdemeanor petty theft convic-
tions, and two federal felony convictions for transportation of
marijuana. The defendant got 50-years-to-life.228
His sentence was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal,
holding that it was not cruel and unusual punishment under ei-
ther the state or federal constitutions.29 The California Supreme
Court summarily denied review without issuing an opinion. 230 The
defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal dis-
trict court, which was denied on the basis that the defendant's
claim was barred by the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).2 l
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the
district court, holding that the AEDPA did not apply, and reached
the merits of the defendant's argument. 232 The Ninth Circuit held
225. "Intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare
case in which a threshold comparison of the crime and the sentence leads to an inference of
gross Disproportionality." Id. at. 1005 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
226. Id.
227. Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of the State of California, 270 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 2001).
228. Id. at 748. The defendant received a sentence of 25-years-to-life for each of the
petty thefts with priors. Since the petty thefts were committed on "separate occasions," the
mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of the Three Strikes law, Pen. Code § 667(c)(6),
applied, resulting in a sentence of 50-years-to-life. See People v. Deloza, 18 Cal.4th 585
(1998).
229. Id. at 750.
230. Id.
231. Under the AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214, a defendant may not seek
federal habeas relief if the state court had already adjudicated the defendant's claims on
their merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
232. The Ninth Circuit found that the state court had committed "clear error" in holding
that the defendant's sentence was constitutional, and thereby had engaged in an "unrea-
sonable application" of U.S. Supreme Court precedent in the area. Andrade, supra, 270
F.3d 747, 766-767.
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that the 50-years-to-life sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment and was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the defendant." The Court conducted a three-
part analysis based on Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Har-
melin.
The Ninth Circuit first compared the defendant's punishment to
his crimes, finding that there was an inference of "gross dispropor-
tionality." The penalty was the functional equivalent of life with-
out possibility of parole because the defendant would not be eligi-
ble for release on parole for 50 years, until he was 87 years old.234
The gravity of the current offenses was small, with no violence or
threat of violence, plus also significant to the Court was the fact
that the defendant's petty theft with prior offenses could have
been charged as misdemeanors." Moreover, the defendant's pri-
ors all came from a single proceeding more than 10 years previous
to the new crime, as opposed to from separate proceedings where
he served separate terms.236
The Ninth Circuit then compared the sentence to punishment
imposed for other crimes in California. The defendant's punish-
ment was exceeded in California only by murder and other violent
crimes .2" Finally, the Ninth Circuit compared the sentence to
punishment imposed in other jurisdictions. The sentence in Cali-
fornia was more severe than virtually every other state's three
strikes laws. 38
233. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 758-766.
234. The defendant was 37 years old at the time he committed his petty theft crimes.
Andrade, supra, 270 F.3d at p. 759. Under In re Cervera, 24 Cal.4th at 1073, the defen-
dant must serve all 25 years of his 25-years-to-life sentences before being eligible for parole.
235. Andrade, 270 F.3d at at 759-760.
236. The defendant's entire criminal record consisted of five felonies, two misdemeanors
and one parole violation. Id.
237. Id. at 761.
238. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762-765. The Ninth Circuit subsequently issued another
opinion on California's Three Strikes law: Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Ninth Circuit held that 25-years-to-life sentences were unconstitutional for defendants
who committed petty theft with priors, even though the "strike" priors did not originate
from the same case-as they did in Andrade--and even though the "strikes" included "vio-
lent" felonies like robberies and assaults with a firearm. One defendant, Mr. Bray, stole
three videotapes from a store, and had four "strike" priors. The other defendant, Mr.
Brown, stole a steering wheel alarm worth $25 from store; he had five "strike" priors. Also
unlike Andrade, the defendants did not receive sentences which were the equivalent of life
without the possibility of parole: Mr. Bray would have been eligible for release at age 59,
and Mr. Brown, at 67. Nonetheless, their sentences were struck down. Brown v. Mayle
used the same three-part analysis as Andrade to reach its result: comparing the defen-
dants' punishment to their crimes yielded an inference of "gross disproportionality"; the
punishment imposed for other crimes in California was equaled or exceeded only by very
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In Ewing, the defendant was convicted of felony grand theft for
stealing three golf clubs from a pro shop in March 2000 worth a
total of $1,197.239 The defendant had four "strike" priors all from
the same case in 1993, three residential burglaries, and one resi-
dential robbery. 24 ° In the robbery, the defendant used a knife on
the victim, but no person was hurt. The defendant was sentenced
in the current case to 25-years-to-life in prison.24'
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence. The
court of appeal found that the defendant had nine convictions
overall (his four "strikes" plus five other assorted misdemeanors),
and held that the sentence was warranted due to the defendant's
recidivism. 24 The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the defen-
dant was sick with AIDS and blind in one eye, but did not give
these facts much weight. In effect, due to the defendant's terminal
illness, the 25-to-life sentence was the equivalent of life without
possibility of parole. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal was unper-
suaded that the sentence was cruel and unusual under either the
state or federal constitution.
The California Supreme Court summarily denied review with-
out an opinion.24' The United States Supreme Court, however,
granted certiorari.2
The Andrade case may be more susceptible to an inference of
"gross disproportionality" than Ewing. On the punishment side of
the equation, 50-years-to-life is a greater sentence than 25-to-life,
although Ewing's AIDS may equalize the sentences. The severity
of the defendant's crimes in Andrade-stealing video tapes worth
less than $154-is less than the Ewing defendant's theft of over one
thousand dollars worth of golf clubs. Further, the defendant's re-
cord in Ewing is more aggravated than in Andrade: the defendant
in Ewing had priors for "violent" felonies; the Andrade defendant's
priors were merely "serious."
Moreover, there are particular features of the Three Strikes law
which made it particularly harsh as applied to the Andrade defen-
violent crimes; and the punishment in California was more severe than in almost all other
states' three strikes laws.
239. Grand theft in California consists of stealing property exceeding $400 in value. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 487(a). Grand theft is a "wobbler," punishable as a felony or misde-
meanor. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17, 489(b).




244. Ewing v. California, No. 01-6978.
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dant. Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, in stressing that Michigan's
sentencing scheme was constitutional, emphasized that "The
scheme provides clear notice of the severe consequences that at-
tach to possession of drugs in wholesale amounts . *...,245 Justice
Kennedy further stressed that Michigan's law was not one where
"the complexity of the scheme obscures the possible sanction for a
crime, resulting in a shock to the offender who learns the severity
of his sentence only after he commits the crime."246
California's Three Strikes law, in contrast to the Michigan
scheme, did not provide "clear notice" to defendants in Mr. An-
drade's position regarding the severity of the penalty, and "the
complexity of the scheme" did "obscure[] the possible sanction for
a crime." This is largely due to the timing of Mr. Andrade's cur-
rent crimes, and the dates when published appellate opinions
were issued clarifying some aspects of the Three Strikes law.
First, when the Andrade defendant committed his petty thefts
with priors in November 1995, no published appellate case had
been issued holding that a defendant could get two strikes from a
single past case. The first case to so hold, People v. Allison,247 was
filed December 29, 1995, after the commission of the defendant's
current petty theft offenses.24' A defendant could well have been
surprised and shocked to learn that he had picked up multiple
"strikes" from a single past case. The five-year priors law in Penal
Code section 667(a) used the exact same type of prior convictions
as the Three Strikes law, and had been construed to require sepa-
rately brought and tried convictions in order to yield valid pri-
ors. 9 The same was true for "violent" felony priors and one-year
priors under Penal Code section 667.5.250
The very idea that one could be subject to greater punishment
for two counts from a single past case would appear to run counter
to traditional penological sentencing theory: A defendant only
reasonably merits increased punishment if he commits a crime,
gets punished, commits another crime, gets punished again, and
then commits a new offense. Indeed, getting two "strikes" from "a
245. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
246. Id.
247. People v. Allison, 41 Cal.App.4th 841 (1995).
248. The Ewing defendant cannot avail himself of this argument because his current
grand theft offense occurred in April 2000, well after this issue had been clarified and de-
fendants put on notice regarding the law's severity. See Ewing Court of Appeal opinion,
supra notes 240-244 and accompanying text.
249. See In re Harris, 49 Cal.3d 131 (1989).
250. See People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.App.4th 1607 (1994).
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single swing" does not even comport with the game of baseball,251
which is the origin of the entire "Three Strikes and You're Out"
concept!
Second, when the Andrade defendant committed his current
crimes, the California Supreme Court had not yet settled the issue
of whether consecutive sentences were required for multiple of-
fenses. This did not occur until the court issued People v. Deloza
in 1998.22 The Three Strikes law's mandatory consecutive sen-
tencing provision is confusing even to trained legal profession-
als,25 and a defendant could well have been "shocked" to learn
that a sentence of 50-years-to-life rather than 25-years-to-life was
required.'
Finally, third, at the time the Andrade defendant committed his
current offenses, the California Supreme Court had not deter-
mined how much of a 25-to-life sentence the defendant would be
forced to serve before being eligible for parole. A common inter-
pretation was that the defendant would serve only 20 years." It
was only when In re Cervera256 was issued in 2001 that everyone
learned a defendant served 25 out of 25 years. This holding, over
five years after the commission of the defendant's current offenses,
increased his sentence by 10 years.257
In all, the defendant in Andrade seems more likely to secure re-
lief than the one in Ewing.25 Many scenarios are possible, with
251. See Official Rules of Major League Baseball, Rule 6.05 (2002 Ed.).
252. Deloza, 18 Cal.4th at 585.
253. Justice Stanley Mosk from the California Supreme Court remarked that these
provisions' "labyrinthine formalism and bewildering... complexity have furrowed into the
psyche of trial courts, counsel, and defendants . . ." People v. Rosbury, 15 Cal.4th 206, 211
(1997), quotation marks omitted.
254. Since the Ewing defendant committed his current crime in 2000, two years after
Deloza was issued, he also cannot avail himself of this argument.
255. See Al Menaster and Alex Ricciardulli, 3 STRIKES MANUAL (Compendium Press
1996), at 3.
256. In re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176 (2001).
257. This argument does apply to the Ewing defendant because he committed his crime
the year before In re Cervera was issued. Yet, the force of the argument is less for him than
Andrade because his expectations of the possibility of release were undercut only by five
rather than 10 years.
258. One wildcard in the equation concerns an issue in Andrade which could prove fatal
to the defendant's case. In addition to the constitutionality of the sentence, another issue
in the case is whether the federal court had the power to grant habeas corpus relief due to
the AEDPA. See, supra note 231. The Supreme Court in Andrade will have to determine
whether the defendant fell within an exception to this rule: when the state court's adjudica-
tion of a claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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the number of defendants potentially affected depending on how
broad the opinion generated by the Supreme Court.
A United States Supreme Court opinion granting relief would be
directly applicable in the state courts for pending cases in the trial
or appellate courts."s Presumably, the opinion would also be ret-
roactive; hence, persons whose cases were final would be allowed
to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the courts where they
were sentenced to secure reductions of their sentences.2 °
In resolving Andrade and Ewing, many outcomes can be envi-
sioned. At one extreme, the Supreme Court could hold that cate-
gorically, regardless of a defendant's past criminal record, it is
cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a defendant to life in
prison for a current non-serious, non-violent crime.261 Such a rul-
ing would affect thousands of pending and old cases.6 2 At another
extreme, the court could hold that a life sentence for a felony, even
as minor as stealing golf clubs or videotapes, is never unconstitu-
tional.2' The more likely outcome is something in the middle.
Even within a middle solution there are parameters. A narrow
ruling would permit only defendants like Andrade whose current
crimes were petty theft and had no violent felonies and got the
equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole to get
a reduction.2' A broader ruling would allow persons who received
any life sentence with no violent priors to be released. An even
259. This was the case in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) when the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment.
260. See, e.g., Romero, 13 Cal.4th at 530, n. 13.
261. This would approximate the ruling in Brown, 283 F.3d at 1019.
262. 3,054 of the people in prison serving life in prison committed a current crime that
was neither "serious" nor violent," and would be entitled to a reduction. See Appendix B5,
June 30, 2002, DOC statistics. Since, presumably, doubled sentences under the Three
Strikes law would be constitutional, many of these defendants would not be entitled to be
immediately released, easing the burden on the court system in re-sentencing the inmates.
263. The rationale would be either that there is no proportionality principle in the
Eighth Amendment for non-capital cases, or that the only offenses which are subject to
review are ones like the parking violation life sentence discussed in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
986, n. 11, and Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274, n. 11.
264. This is would be a very small number. It would be reduced even further if the
Court hinged its relief on the lack of notice arguments discussed supra notes 247 to 257 and
accompanying text. Effectively, only defendants sentenced before December 29, 1995, who
committed non-serious, non-violent crimes and whose priors originated from single past
cases would be eligible for relief. This would be a tiny number. See Appendix B1 (as of
May 1996, there were approximately only 972 defendants overall sentenced to life for non-
serious, non-violent current offenses).
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broader ruling would expand the current offenses subject to relief
to include all non-violent wobblers.265
A Doomsday possibility is that the defendants will lose, and lose
big, with virtually none of the defendants in California subject to
Three Strikes finding anything useful in the Court's opinions.
Then what?
C. The second coming of Romero?
If things go badly for the defendants in Andrade and Ewing,
what are the odds that the California Supreme Court could bail
out the defendants? Slim and none, with slim having walked out
the door, would appear to be the knee-jerk reaction. A quick ex-
amination of the way that these issues have been dealt with in the
past would seem to bode ill for defendants. However, California
cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence has traditionally
been kinder and gentler to defendants than the United States'
Highest Court.
A trend in the California Supreme Court and the Courts of Ap-
peal with Three Strikes has been to approve the existence of
judges' exercise of discretion, but to then sharply limit the discre-
tion, rejecting categorical challenges that would restrict the law's
application.
Romero approved dismissing priors and imposing sentences less
than 25-years-to-life; the supreme court in Williams, along with
lower appellate courts, subsequently eviscerated the discretion.266
The California Supreme Court held that judges have power to re-
duce "wobblers" to misdemeanors despite the fact that "strike"
prior have been proved.267 Yet the supreme court also held that
265. This would include not just petty theft with a prior, but also grand theft, commer-
cial burglary, and receiving stolen property. It would exclude violent "wobblers" like as-
sault with a weapon because life in prison for violent current crimes-regardless of their
'wobbler" status-would likely be constitutional. It would also exclude some non-violent
non-"wobblers," like possession of cocaine. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350(a)
(possession of cocaine is a straight felony). Such an exclusion would be difficult to justify,
however. Possession of methamphetamine is a "wobbler" (see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11377(a)) that would be subject to relief, but cocaine is a straight felony that would not.
This is especially so given the fact that more persons of color tend to be arrested and prose-
cuted for cocaine than methamphetamine possession. See Erin Heath, One-Track Justice,
THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 2001, Vol. 33, No. 33.
266. See supra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
267. People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), 14 Cal.4th 968 (1997).
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courts can abuse their discretion when they reduce "wobblers,"
and prosecutors may appeal such reductions on that basis.2"8
Challenges that would have foreclosed, or even limited, the use
of the Three Strikes law in specific situations have been almost
uniformly rejected. For example, attempts to limit Three Strikes
by requiring that a defendant's priors must have occurred after
the law was enacted were laughed out of court, despite the under-
lying unfairness and lack of notice to defendants."9 Appellate
courts have held that dual use the same prior to impose a three
strikes sentence and add five additional years is required;270 that
the same prior must be dual used as a "strike" and as an element
of the current offense;271 and that the same prior must be dual
used as both a "strike" and as a one-year, Penal Code section
272667.5(b) prior.
The very first published case dealing with the Three Strikes law
rejected multiple arguments which would have limited the num-
ber of years which could have been imposed on multiple current
offenses.273
268. People v. Statum, 28 Cal.4th 682 (2002). Judges have also been given the discre-
tion to order that the sentences on multiple current offenses run concurrent to one another
when they occur on "the same occasion." People v. Hendrix, 16 Cal.4th 508 (1997); People
v. Deloza, 18 Cal.4th 585 (1998). So far no opinion has addressed whether judges could
abuse their discretion in sentencing counts concurrently. The California Rules of Court,
Rule 4.425, specifies the criteria that courts must follow in making this decision, leading to
the possibility that a judge could be reversed for failing to adequately justify his or her
action.
269. A veritable forest of appellate opinions uniformly rejected all ex post facto and
statutory arguments, holding that "strike" priors could originate from cases from before or
after March 7, 1994. See Gonzales v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.App.4th 1302 (1995); People v.
Reed, 33 Cal.App.4th 1608 (1995); People v. Hatcher, 33 Cal.App.4th 1526 (1995); People v.
Green, 36 Cal.App.4th 280 (1995); People v. Sipe, 36 Cal.App.4th 468 (1995). More re-
cently, cases held that the new Proposition 21 priors also could originate from before the
date Pro. 21 was enacted. People v. James, 91 Cal.App.4th 1147 (2001); People v. Bowden,
102 Cal.App.4th 387 (2002).
270. People v. Dotson, 16 Cal.4th 547 (1997); People v. Ramirez, 33 Cal.App.4th 559
(1995); People v. Anderson, 35 Cal.App.4th 587 (1995).
27. 1. People v. Garcia, 25 Cal.4th 744 (2001); People v. Nobleton, 38 Cal.App.4th 76
(1995); People v. White Eagle, 48 Cal.App.4th 1511 (1996).
272. People v. Cressy, 47 Cal.App.4th 981 (1996). Dual use of the same prior is even
required under both the Habitual Sex Offender statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.71, and as
a "strike" prior People v. Murphy, 25 Cal.4th 136 (2001). And the same is true under the
One Strike law, CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61, and as a "strike" prior. People v. Acosta, 29
Cal.4th 105 (2002) (the result being that a court can impose a 25-years-life sentence under
§§ 667.61 or 667.71, and then further increase the punishment under the Three Strikes law
to 50 or 75-years-to-life, depending on whether the defendant has one or more "strike"
priors).
273. People v. Martin, 32 Cal.App.4th 656 (1995).
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With these cases as the background, looking for an opinion
which would knock out a big chunk of the Three Strikes law does
not appear very promising. California Courts of Appeal have re-
peatedly upheld the constitutionality of the Three Strikes law,
both on its face,274 and as applied to individual defendants on cruel
and unusual punishment grounds.275
Even in cases where the current offense was not a "serious" or
"violent" felony, life sentences have been upheld by the lower ap-
pellate courts."'
California Courts of Appeal have stuck to their holding that the
Three Strikes law is not cruel and unusual punishment even after
the Ninth Circuit opinions in Andrade27 7 and Brown v. Mayle.275
People v. Mantanez"9 and People v. Romero5 ° were the first pub-
lished California Court of Appeal opinions discussing the applica-
bility of the Ninth Circuit cases. Mantanez and Romero II were
unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit opinions.
In Mantanez, the defendant was convicted of possession of her-
oin and receiving stolen property. Four "strike" priors were found
true. All told, the defendant had 10 felony convictions, and had
served four separate prison terms. He had also repeatedly vio-
lated probation and parole. The trial judge sentenced the defen-
dant to 25-years-to-life in prison, refusing to reduce the sentence
under Section 1385 and Romero.2s'
The court of appeal recognized that, "On federal constitutional
questions, of course, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
274. People v. Sipe, 36 Cal.App.4th 468 (1995); People v. Edwards, 97 Cal.App.4th 161
(2002).
275. See, e.g., People v. Cartwright, 39 Cal.App.4th 1123 (1995) (def. convicted of 15
current violent sex felonies with four "strike" priors); People v. Ingram, 40 Cal.App.4th
1397 (1995) (def. convicted of two current residential burglaries with two "strike" priors);
People v. Ramirez, 54 Cal.App.4th 888 (1997) (def. convicted of current assault with deadly
weapon with two "strike" priors).
276. See, e.g., People v. Kinsey, 40 Cal.App.4th 1621 (1995) (def. convicted of felony
attempted spousal battery with three "strike" priors); People v. Cooper, 43 Cal.App.4th 815
(1996) (def. convicted of current felon with firearm with three "strike" priors); People v.
Stone, 75 Cal.App.4th 707 (1999) (25-to-life for manufacturing PCP with two "strike" priors,
including one for voluntary manslaughter, not cruel and unusual); People v. Martinez, 71
Cal.App.4th 1502 (1999) (25-to-life not cruel for current felonies of possession of metham-
phetamine and attempting to dissuade a peace officer with two "strike" priors).
277. 270 F.3d 743 (9' h Cir. 2001).
278. 283 F.3d 1019 (9' Cir. 2001).
279. 98 Cal.App.4th 354 (2002).
280. 99 Cal.App.4th 1418 (2002) (This was a different defendant than the one in the
Romero case from the Supreme Court. For clarity's sake, the Court of Appeal case will be
hereafter referred to as Romero II).
281. Mantanez, 98 Cal.App.4th at 360.
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United States control, while the decisions of lower federal courts
are persuasive but not controlling."82 Nonetheless, Mantanez
stated, "we believe the Ninth Circuit cases noted above were not
correctly decided, we decline to follow them, and we affirm the
judgment and sentence imposed on Mantanez herein." 3
In Romero II, the defendant was convicted in 2000 of felony
petty theft with a prior for stealing a $3 magazine and possession
of a drug pipe. He had a "strike" for residential burglary in 1983,
and another "strike" for lewd conduct with a child in 1990. He had
just two prior convictions other than the "strikes," and they were
both misdemeanors. 2' Nonetheless, the court of appeal affirmed
the defendant's 25-to-life sentence. Romero II disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit, finding nothing cruel or unusual about this case.285
The California Supreme Court has not addressed the constitu-
tionality of the Three Strikes law, despite repeated requests from
defendants that it do so." Even when four justices of the United
States Supreme Court urged the California Supreme Court to ad-
dress the issue, the High Court did nothing. 7
Despite this, after the United States Supreme Court hands
down its decisions in Andrade and Ewing, it is likely that the Cali-
fornia High Court will act. Regardless of the scope of relief offered
by Andrade and Ewing, some defendants will undoubtedly be ex-
cluded from trying to get their sentences overturned.2" Defen-
dants will petition the California Court to interpret the California
Constitution in order to provide more relief than its federal coun-
terpart. Will they succeed?
The test announced by the California Supreme Court for deter-
mining whether punishment is cruel or unusual under the Cali-
fornia Constitution is similar to that used by the Supreme Court
in Solem v. Helm."' A sentence may violate the state constitu-
tional ban on cruel and unusual punishment 290 if "it is so dispro-
282. Id. at 358, citing People v. Camacho, 23 Cal.4th 824, 837 (2000), quotation marks
omitted.
283. Id.
284. Romero, 99 Cal.App.4th at 1423.
285. Id. As with Mantanez, the trial judge had refused to reduce the sentence under
Romero.
286. See Erik G. Luna, Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 76-78
(1998).
287. See Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114.
288. See supra notes 263-265 and accompanying text.
289. Solem 463 U.S. at 277.
290. CAL. CONST., Art. I, § 17.
Fall 2002
Duquesne Law Review
portionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity."
291
In California the option offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, refusing to review the length of a sentence for dis-
proportionality in all but extreme cases, such as the life-sentence-
for-a parking-violation example, is not available.292 The California
Supreme Court has interpreted its constitution so that "a statu-
tory punishment may violate the constitutional prohibition not
only if it is inflicted by a cruel or unusual method, but also if it is
grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.293
The California Supreme Court in People v. Dillon recognized
that:
Whether a particular punishment is disproportionate to the
offense is, of course, a question of degree. The choice of fitting
and proper penalties is not an exact science, but a legislative
skill involving an appraisal of the evils to be corrected, the
weighing of practical alternatives, consideration of relevant
policy factors, and responsiveness to the public will; in appro-
priate cases, some leeway for experimentation may also be
permissible. The judiciary, accordingly, should not interfere
in this process unless a statute prescribes a penalty 'out of all
proportion to the offense' [citations], i.e., so severe in relation
to the crime as to violate the prohibition against cruel or un-
usual punishment.294
In order to ascertain whether a particular punishment is dis-
proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed, the court con-
ducts a three-pronged analysis which itself has recognized as very
similar to Solem and to Justice Kennedy's test in Harmelin v.
Michigan.295 As explained by the court of appeal:
291. People v. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 (1983), quoting In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424
(1972).
292. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986, n. 11, and Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274, n. 11.
293. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d at 478.
294. Id. quoting In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d at 423-424.
295. See Dillon, 34 Cal.3d at 479 ("The United States Supreme Court has recently reaf-
firmed a similar rule applicable to the corresponding provision of the federal Constitution,"
citing Solem v. Helm, supra, and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)). In Enmund two
persons robbed and fatally shot an elderly couple at their farmhouse; defendant Enmund's
sole involvement was that at the time of the crimes he was sitting in a car parked some 200
yards away, waiting to help the robbers escape. The Enmund defendant was convicted of
being an aider and abettor and hence a principal in the commission of a first degree felony
murder, and was sentenced to death. The Court reversed, holding that such punishment
was unconstitutionally disproportionate under these circumstances.
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First, we examine the nature of the offense and/or the of-
fender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both
present to society. A look at the nature of the offense includes
a look at the totality of the circumstances, including motive,
the way the crime was committed, the extent of the defen-
dant's involvement, and the consequences of defendant's acts.
A look at the nature of the offender includes an inquiry into
whether 'the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the de-
fendant's individual culpability as shown by such factors as
his age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state
of mind. [quoting People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d 441, 479])
Next, we compare the challenged punishment with the pun-
ishment prescribed for more serious crimes in the same juris-
diction. And finally, the challenged punishment is compared
with punishment for the same offense in other jurisdictions."'
The importance of each prong depends on the facts of each case.
Under the California Constitution, an examination of the first
prong alone can result in a finding of cruel or unusual punish-
ment.
29 7
Dillon held that a sentence of life in prison without the possibil-
ity of parole was disproportionate to the crime of felony murder as
applied to a young defendant who had minimal involvement in the
crime."' In doing so, the Supreme Court followed a long line of
cases where it had invalidated sentences. In Lynch the Supreme
Court held that an indeterminate life sentence with the possibility
of parole for a second-offense indecent exposure was unconstitu-
tionally excessive.299 The court in the years since Lynch struck
down legislation barring recidivist narcotic offenders from being
considered for parole for 10 years;00 ordered the release of a defen-
dant who served 22 years for a nonviolent act of child molesta-
tion;301 and invalidated the statutory requirement that persons
convicted of misdemeanor public lewdness must register with the
police as sex offenders."2
296. People v. Thongvilay, 62 Cal.App.4th 71, 88 (1998).
297. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d at 479, 482-483; People v. Young, 11 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1308-1311
(1992).
298. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d at 479.
299. Id.
300. In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 917-929 (1974); In re Grant, 18 Cal.3d 1, 5-18 (1976).
301. In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal.3d 639, 653-656 (1975).
302. In re Reed, 33 Cal.3d 914 (1983).
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The California Supreme Court may well have hit a high-water
mark in Dillon, and, given the much more conservative composi-
tion of the current court, it might be unrealistic for them to wan-
der too far from their big brothers and sisters in Washington
D.C.
30 3
Having said that, the California Constitution can be and has
been susceptible to construction in a manner more favorable for
persons charged with crimes than the Federal Constitution. The
California Supreme Court has often recognized that the "Califor-
nia Constitution is a document of independent force and effect
that may be interpreted in a manner more protective of defen-
dants' rights than that extended by the federal Constitution."
30 4
The language of California's equivalent to the Eighth Amend-
ment in particular appears broader than its federal counterpart.
The Eighth Amendment provides that there "shall not be... cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." Article I, section 17, of the
California Constitution states that "Cruel or unusual punishment
may not be inflicted . . . ." This might be a semantic distinction
that makes no difference.3 0
However, there are important differences between Justice Ken-
nedy's test in Harmelin and the Dillon three-part analysis. For
one, under Kennedy's test, a court does not proceed to the intra,
and inter-jurisdictional analysis unless it has first found an "in-
ference of gross disproportionality."3 6 Under Dillon, a court must
examine all three prongs. Also, and maybe most importantly, Jus-
tice Kennedy specifically stated that no one factor alone can result
in overturning a statute.3 7 In fact, one factor alone can preserve a
law according to Kennedy.3 8 Under the Dillon test, an examina-
tion of the first prong alone can result in a finding of cruel or un-
usual punishment. 0
Whether these differences are enough to allow defendants to se-
cure broader relief than the Andrade and Ewing decisions is un-
known. One can bet that the defendants certainly will be making
this argument in the near future.
303. See Culver, supra note 103, at 1463.
304. People v. Monge, 16 Cal.4th 826, 844 (1997), quoting People v. Fields, 13 Cal.4th
289, 298 (1996). Accord, People v. Hanson, 23 Cal.4th 355, 364 (2000).
305. This is precisely what Mantanez held. See 98 Cal.App.4th at 360.
306. Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring.).
307. Id. at 1004.
308. Id.
309. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d at 479, 482-483; People v. Young, 11 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1308-1311
(1992).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The failure of judicial discretion to undermine the Three Strikes
law could amount to a pyrrhic victory for supporters of the Three
Strikes law. Romero's inability to act as a "safety valve" has
added weight to the severity of the penalty provided by the law.
As the Unites States Supreme Court considers whether Three
Strikes sentences for non-aggravated offenses constitute "grossly
disproportionate" punishment, supporters of the Three Strikes
statute will be unable to point to Romero as softening the impact
of the law.
Should the nation's highest court in Andrade and Ewing provide
no effective relief for California defendants, their sole realistic
hope will be the California Supreme Court. In this event, defen-
dants and their families will be eagerly waiting for the second
coming of Jesus Romero.
Duquesne Law Review
APPENDIX A
THE "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT" LAW: AN UPDATE
PRESENTED TO: ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE, HON.
ROBERT M. HERTZBERG, CHAIR
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, October 14, 1997
SUMMARY
Second - and Third-Strike Inmate Population Increasing
* The Department of Corrections (CDC) projects that the second
and third-strike prison population will exceed 55,000 by 2002,
when one of four inmates in prison will be a "second-" or
"third-striker." It should be noted at the CDC has consistently
overestimated the number of second- and third-strikers, although
the estimates are becoming more accurate as the state gains more
experience with the "Three Strikes" population.
Commitment Offenses Differ Substantially Among Second-
and Third-Strikers
* Less than one-fourth of second-strikers were admitted to
prison for a violent or serious offense.
* The most common second-strike offenses are possession of
controlled substance, petty theft with a prior theft, and second
degree burglary.
* Slightly more than half of third-strikers were admitted to
prison for a violent or serious offense.
* The most common third-strike offenses are robbery and first
degree burglary (both are considered violent or serious offenses),
followed by possession of a controlled substance, second degree
burglary, and possession of a weapon.
0 Second- and third-strikers are being sent to prison in num-
bers that are not necessarily reflective of each county's general
prison commitment patterns, as shown above.
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* The differences are primarily the result of variations in
charging practices of prosecutors and sentencing practices of
courts.
About 800 Second-Strikers Admitted to Prison Each Month
* The number of second-strikers admitted to prison monthly
has remained relatively constant in the past two years. The num-
ber has changed little since the People v. Romero court decision,
which specifies that judges retain the authority to not consider
prior convictions under the Three Strikes law.
* Since its inception, there has been a total of 29,007 sec-
ond-strikers admitted to prison.
* As of the end of August 1997, there were about 24,600 sec-
ond-strikers in prison or in a community correctional facility and
about 4,400 second-strikers on parole.
About 120 Third-Strikers Admitted to Prison Each Month
* The number of third-strikers admitted to prison monthly
has increased only slightly in the past two years. The number has
changed little since the Romero decision.
* Since its inception, there has been a total of 3,568
third-strikers admitted to state prison. As of the end of August
1997, all were still incarcerated.
* The total state prison population will increase substantially
in the coming years, in large part because of the Three Strikes
law.
* Based on the most recent projections, the prison system will
exhaust all available space by late 2000 and there will be a short-







ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH JULY 10, 1996
NUMBER OF THIRD STRIKE CASES
BY OFFENSE GROUP
AS OF MAY 31, 1996
Percent of
Frequency Total Cumulative Cumulative
Offense Group Court Frequency Frequency Percent
MISSING 45 2.4 45 2.4
MURDER 1s 25 1.3 70 3.7
MURDER 2ND 22 1.2 92 4.9
MANSLAUGHTER 7 0.4 99 5.2
VEH. MANS. 1 0.1 100 5.3
ROBBERY 300 15.9 400 21.2
ASSAULT/WEAPON 68 3.6 468 24.7
OTHER ASSAULT 68 3.6 536 28.3
RAPE 23 1.2 559 29.6
LEWD ACT/ CHILD 42 2.2 601 31.8
ORAL
COPULULATION 10 0.5 611 32.3
SODOMY 5 0.3 616 32.6
PENETRATION
WITH OBJECT 5 0.2 620 32.8
OTHER SEX
OFFENSES 9 0.5 626 33.3
KIDNAPPING 15 0.8 644 34.1
BURGLARY 1sT 244 12.9 888 47.0
BURGLARY 2ND 168 8.9 1056 55.8
GRAND THEFT 25 1.3 1080 57.1
PETTY. THEFT
W/PRIOR 114 6.0 1194 63.1
RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY 53 2.8 1247 65.9
VEHICLE THEFT 72 3.8 1319 69.8
FORGERY /FRAUD 13 0.7 1332 70.4
OTHER PROPERTY 10 0.5 1342 71.0
CS+ POSSESSION 186 9.8 1528 80.8
CS+ POSSESSION FOR
SALE, ETC. 78 4.1 1606 84.9
CS+ SALES, ETC. 77 4.1 1683 89.0
CS+ OTHER 28 1.5 1711 90.5
MARIJ. POSSESSION
FOR SALE 2 0.1 1713 90.6
MARIJUANA SALES 16 0.8 1729 91.4
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ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH OCTOBER 16, 1997




Frequency Total Cumulative Cumulative
Offense Group Court Frequency Frequency Percent
MURDER 1sv 76 2.1 76 2.1
MURDER 2ND 50 1.4 126 3.5
MANSLAUGHTER 18 0.5 144 4.0
VEHICULAR
MANSLAUGHTER 1 0.0 145 4.0
ROBBERY 647 17.8 792 21.8
ASSAULT W/
DEADLY WEAPON 161 4.4 953 26.2
OTHER ASSAULT/
BATTERY 145 4.0 1098 30.2
RAPE 66 1.8 1164 32.0
LEWD ACT
WITH CHILD 90 2.5 1254 34.5
ORAL COPULATION 25 0.7 1270 35.2
SODOMY 12 0.3 1291 35.5
PENETRATION
W/OBJECT 12 0.3 1303 35.8
OTHER SEX
OFFENSES 36 1.0 1339 36.8
KIDNAPPING 32 0.9 1371 37.7
BURGLARY 1sT 455 12.2 1816 49.9
BURGLARY 2ND 278 7.6 2094 57.6
GRAND THEFT 36 1.0 2130 58.6
PETTY THEFT
WITH PRIOR 197 5.4 2327 64.0
RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY 87 2.4 2414 66.4
VEHICLE THEFT 126 3.5 2540 69.9
FORGERY/FRAUD 36 1.0 2576 70.8
OTHER PROPERTY 16 0.4 2592 71.3
CS+ POSSESSION 344 9.5 2936 80.7
CS+ POSSESSION FOR
SALE, ETC. 141 3.9 3077 84.6
CS+ SALES, ETC. 121 3.3 3198 88.0
CS+ MFG. 10 0.3 3208 88.2
CS+ OTHER 52 1.4 3260 89.2
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Frequency Total Cumulative Cumulative
Offense Group Court Frequency Frequency Percent
MISSING 65 1.0 65 1.0
MURDER 1sT 107 1.7 172 2.7
MURDER 2ND 89 1.4 261 4.1
MANSLAUGHTER 22 0.3 283 4.4
VEHICULAR
MANSLAUGHTER 6 0.1 289 4.5
ROBBERY 1162 18.2 1451 22.8
ASSAULT WITH
DEADLY WEAPON 302 4.7 1753 27.5
OTHER ASSAULT/
BATTERY 364 5.7 2111 33.2
RAPE 105 1.6 2222 34.9
LEWD ACT
WITH CHILD 172 2.7 2394 37.6
ORAL
COPULATION 40 0.6 2434 38.2
SODOMY 16 0.3 2450 38.4
PENETRATION
W/ OBJECT 13 0.2 2463 38.6
OTHER SEX
OFFENSES 119 1.9 2582 40.5
KIDNAPPING 63 1.0 2645 41.5
BURGLARY 1sT 695 10.9 3340 52.4
BURGLARY 2ND 426 6.7 3766 59.1
GRAND THEFT 96 1.5 3862 60.6
PETTY THEFT
WITH PRIOR 323 5.1 4185 65.7
RECEIVING STOLEN
PROPERTY 151 2.4 4336 68.0
VEHICLE THEFT 197 3.1 4533 71.1
FORGERY /FRAUD 56 0.9 4589 72.0
OTHER PROPERTY 30 0.5 4619 72.5
CS+ POSSESSION 616 9.7 5235 82.1
CS+ POSSESSION
FOR SALE, ETC. 261 4.1 5496 86.2
CS+ SALES, ETC. 176 2.8 5672 89.0
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Percent of
Frequency Total
Offense Group Court Frequency
CS+ MFG. 21 0.3
CS+ OTHER 83 1.3
MARIJ. POSSESSION
FOR SALE 5 0.1









































ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH JULY 2002
SECOND AND THIRD STRIKERS IN THE INSTITUTION POPULATION
BY OFFENSE CATEGORY, OFFENSE GROUP AND ADMISSION OR
RETURN STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2002









































































































































NOTE: PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED NUMBERS MAY DIFFER
BECAUSE OF MODIFICATIONS TO THE DATABASE.
Total
Number
2,761
999
1,440
697
174
12,945
6,122
2,533
1,504
244
236
4
234
162
29
11,068
81
404
142
2,033
1,033
3,693
PV-RTC
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